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Abstract
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) is a logic for proving security properties of network protocols that use
public and symmetric key cryptography. The logic is designed around a process calculus with actions
for possible protocol steps including generating new random numbers, sending and receiving messages,
and performing decryption and digital signature veriﬁcation actions. The proof system consists of axioms
about individual protocol actions and inference rules that yield assertions about protocols composed of
multiple steps. Although assertions are written only using the steps of the protocol, the logic is sound in a
strong sense: each provable assertion involving a sequence of actions holds in any protocol run containing
the given actions and arbitrary additional actions by a malicious adversary. This approach lets us prove
security properties of protocols under attack while reasoning only about the actions of honest parties in the
protocol. PCL supports compositional reasoning about complex security protocols and has been applied to
a number of industry standards including SSL/TLS, IEEE 802.11i and Kerberos V5.
Keywords: Security protocol analysis, logic, composition
1 Introduction
Network security protocols, such as key-exchange and key-management protocols,
are diﬃcult to design and debug. For example, the 802.11 Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP) protocol, used to protect link-layer communications from eavesdropping
and other attacks, has several serious security ﬂaws [11]. Anomalies and short-
comings have also been discovered in standards and proposed standards for Secure
Sockets Layer [76,60], the later 802.11i wireless authentication protocols [37,38],
Kerberos [43,7,19,14], and others. Although many of these protocols may seem
relatively simple, in comparison with more complex distributed systems, security
1 Email: danupam@cs.stanford.edu
2 Email: aderek@cs.stanford.edu
3 Email: mitchell@cs.stanford.edu
4 Email: arnab@cs.stanford.edu
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 172 (2007) 311–358
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2007.02.012
1571-0661 © 2007 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
protocols must achieve certain goals when an arbitrary number of multiple ses-
sions are executed concurrently and an attacker may use information acquired in
one session to compromise the security of another. Since security protocols form
the cornerstones of modern secure networked systems, it is important to develop
informative, accurate, and deployable methods for ﬁnding errors and proving that
protocols meet their security requirements. While model checking has proven useful
for ﬁnding certain classes of errors in network security protocols [59,60,66], logical
methods and proof procedures are needed to show that protocols are correct, with
respect to precise models of protocol execution and precise models of the capabil-
ities of malicious attackers. In this paper, we describe a speciﬁc logic, developed
for the purpose of proving security properties of network protocols, and give some
examples of its use.
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) [20,21,22,23,24,25,26,29,30,38,67,68] is a for-
mal logic for stating and proving security properties of network protocols. The logic
codiﬁes and supports direct reasoning about the consequences of individual protocol
steps, in a way that allows properties of individual steps to be combined to prove
properties of complex protocols. The basic assertions are similar to Hoare logic [40]
and dynamic logic [35], with the formula θ[P ]Xϕ stating that after actions P are
executed in thread X, starting from a state where formula θ is true, formula ϕ is
true about the resulting state. While the formula only mentions the actions P of
thread X, states reached after X does P may arise as the result of these actions
and any additional actions performed by other threads, including arbitrary actions
by an attacker. PCL includes a number of action predicates, such as Send(X, t),
Receive(X, t), New(X, t), Decrypt(X, t), Verify(X, t), which assert that the named
thread has performed the indicated actions. For example, Send(X, t) holds in a run
if thread X sent the term t as a message. One class of secrecy properties can be
speciﬁed using the predicate Has(X, t), which intuitively means that t is built from
constituents that X either generated (using a new action) or received in a way that
did not hide them under encryption by a key not had by X. One predicate that is
novel to PCL is Honest(Xˆ), which asserts that all actions of Xˆ are actions prescribed
by the protocol. Honest is used primarily to assume that one party has followed
the prescribed steps of the protocol. For example, if Alice initiates a transaction
with Bob, and wishes to conclude that only Bob knows the data she sends, she may
be able to provably do so by explicitly assuming that Bob is honest. If Bob is not
honest, then Bob may make his private key known to the attacker, allowing the
attacker to decrypt intercepted messages.
The PCL axioms and inference rules fall into several categories. One simple but
necessary class of axioms assert that after an action is performed, the indicated
thread has performed that action. Another class of axioms are those that state
properties of cryptographic operations. For example, an axiom reﬂecting the un-
forgeability property of digital signatures states that whenever an agent veriﬁes the
signature of an honest agent, then that agent must have generated a signature on
that message and sent it out in an earlier message. PCL also uses a novel form
of induction, currently referred to as the “honesty rule”, in which induction over
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basic sequences of actions performed by honest agents can be used to derive con-
clusions about arbitrary runs in the presence of adversary actions. To see how this
works, in simple form, suppose that in some protocol, whenever a principal receives
a message of the form ENCK{|a, b|}, representing the encryption of a pair (a, b)
under key K, the principal then responds with ENCK{|b|}. Assume further that
this is the only situation in which the protocol speciﬁes that a message consisting
of a single encrypted datum is sent. Using the honesty rule, it is possible to prove
that if a principal A is honest, and A sends a message of the form ENCK{|b|}, then
A must have previously received a message of the form ENCK{|a, b|}. For certain
protocols, this form of reasoning allows us to prove that if one protocol partici-
pant completes the prescribed sequence of actions, and another principal named in
one of the messages is honest, then the two participants are guaranteed a form of
authentication.
Like the previous generation of protocol logics exempliﬁed by BAN and GNY
logics [13,32], PCL was also initially designed as a logic of authentication, involves
annotating programs with assertions, does not require explicit reasoning about the
actions of an attacker, and uses formulas for freshness, sending and receiving mes-
sages, and to express that two agents have a shared secret. In contrast to BAN and
related logics, PCL avoids the need for an “abstraction” phase because PCL formu-
las contain the protocol programs, and PCL addresses temporal concepts directly,
both through modal formulas that refer speciﬁcally to particular points in the exe-
cution of a protocol, and through temporal operators in pre- and post-conditions.
PCL is also formulated using standard logical concepts (predicate logic and modal
operators), does not involve “jurisdiction” or “belief”, and has a direct connection
with the execution semantics of network protocols that is used in explicit reason-
ing about actions of a protocol and an attacker, such as with Paulson’s inductive
method [64] and Schneider’s rank function method [71].
A distinctive goal of PCL is to support compositional reasoning about secu-
rity protocols, including parallel composition of diﬀerent protocols, and sequential
composition of protocol steps. For example, many protocols assume that long-term
cryptographic keys have been properly distributed to protocol agents. PCL allows
proofs of key-distribution protocols to be combined with proofs for protocols that
use these keys. Another aspect of PCL is a composition method based on protocol
templates, which are “abstract” protocols containing function variables for some of
the operations used to construct messages. In the template method, correctness
of a protocol template may be established under certain assumptions about these
function variables. Then, a proof for an actual protocol is obtained by replacing the
function variables with combinations of operations that satisfy the proof assump-
tions. PCL appears to scale well to industrial protocols of ﬁve to twenty messages
(or more), in part because PCL proofs appear to be relatively short (for formal
proofs) and it has been successfully applied to a number of industry standards in-
cluding SSL/TLS, IEEE 802.11i and Kerberos V5. The PCL composition theorems
are particularly useful in carrying out these larger-scale case studies.
This paper collects results from previous papers, develops the basic concepts in
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A→ B : m
B → A : n, SIGB{|n,m,A|}
A→ B : SIGA{|n,m,B|}
Fig. 1. Challenge-response protocol as arrows-and-messages
a uniform notation and semantic setting, improves on some of the previous technical
deﬁnitions and proofs, and completes some details omitted from previous papers.
The core of PCL was formulated earlier in [30,24]. Subsequent work on proof
methods for PCL [20,21,22,23,68] as well as case studies using PCL [5,38,68] led to
extensions and modiﬁcations to the syntax, semantics and proof system. In this
paper, we unify the results in the earlier papers by presenting a deﬁnition of the
logic using a uniform notation. Speciﬁcally, this paper subsumes [30,24] in scope
and draws on the programming language syntax and the treatment of temporal
operators from [5].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the syntax and
operational semantics for the protocol programming language. Section 3 presents
the syntax and semantics for PCL, with the proof system and soundness theorem
in Section 4. An application of the formal system to an authentication protocol is
presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents theorems about sequential and parallel
composition of protocols and illustrates their use through application to a key ex-
change protocol. Section 7 summarizes other results associated with PCL, which are
not elaborated in this paper. Related work is discussed in Section 8 with conclusions
in Section 9.
2 Modelling Protocols
In order to formally state and prove properties of security protocols we ﬁrst need
to represent protocols parts as mathematical objects and deﬁne how they execute.
The common informal arrows-and-messages notation (used, for example, in [69,12])
is generally insuﬃcient, since it only presents the executions of the protocol that
occur when there is no attack. One important part of security analysis involves
understanding the way honest principals running a protocol will respond to messages
from a malicious attacker. In addition, our protocol logic requires more information
about a protocol than the set of protocol executions obtained from honest and
malicious parties; we need a high-level description of the program executed by each
principal performing each protocol role so that we know not only which actions
occur in a run (and which do not), but why they occur.
Now, we show how protocols are represented with an example. Figure 1 shows
the standard three-way signature based challenge-response protocol (CR) in the
informal arrows-and-messages notation. The goal of the protocol – mutual authen-
tication of two parties, is achieved by exchanging two fresh nonces m and n, and
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the signature over both nonces and the identity of the other party.
The roles of the same protocol are written out in our notation in Figure 2, writ-
ing Xˆ and Yˆ for the principals executing roles InitCR and RespCR, respectively.
We diﬀerentiate between principals (denoted by Xˆ, Yˆ , . . . ) which correspond to
protocol participants and may be involved in more than one execution of the pro-
tocol at any point and threads (denoted by X, Y , . . . ) which refer to a principal
executing one particular session of the protocol. In this example, the protocol con-
sists of two roles, the initiator role and the responder role. The sequence of actions
in the initiator role is given by the cord InitCR in Figure 2. In words, the actions
of a principal executing the role InitCR are: generate a fresh random number; send
a message with the random number to the peer Yˆ ; receive a message with source
address Yˆ ; verify that the message contains Yˆ ’s signature over the data in the ex-
pected format; and ﬁnally, send another message to Yˆ with the initiator’s signature
over the nonce sent in the ﬁrst message, the nonce received from Yˆ and Yˆ ’s identity.
Formally, a protocol will be given by a ﬁnite set of roles, one for each role of the
protocol. In addition to the sequence of actions, a cord has static input and output
parameters used when sequentially composing roles.
InitCR≡ (Yˆ )[
new m;
send Xˆ, Yˆ ,m;
receive Yˆ , Xˆ, y, s;
verify s, (y,m, Xˆ), Yˆ ;
r := sign (y,m, Yˆ ), Xˆ ;
send Xˆ, Yˆ , r;
]X()
RespCR≡ ()[
receive Xˆ, Yˆ , x;
new n;
r := sign (n, x, Xˆ), Yˆ ;
send Yˆ , Xˆ, n, r;
receive Xˆ, Yˆ , t;
verify t, (n, x, Yˆ ), Xˆ ;
]Y ()
Fig. 2. Roles of the Challenge-response protocol
2.1 Protocol Programming Language
Our protocol programming language is a conventional process calculus in the same
vein as CCS, CSP, and their variants and descendants [41,57]. However, since the
protocols we consider in this paper are a concurrent composition of sequential roles,
the process calculus is tailored to this form. The formalism was originally described
in [29,30] as cord calculus, a reference to the strand space formalism [31], which con-
veniently formalizes the practice of describing protocols by “arrows-and-messages”,
and displays the distributed traces of interacting processes. However, while strand
spaces provide a global and static view of the information ﬂow, we needed to analyze
dynamics of distributed reasoning and computation. In order to formally capture
the ways in which principals’ actions (e.g. what they receive) may determine and
change their later action (e.g. what they will send), we progressed from our initial
attempt to use the strand model directly to a process calculus approach with op-
erational semantics in the style of chemical abstract machine [9]. To represent the
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(keys) K ::= k basic key
N name
K inverse key
(basic terms) u ::= x basic term variable
n nonce
N name
P thread
K key
u, u tuple of basic terms
(terms) t ::= y term variable
u basic term
t, t tuple of terms
ENCK{|t|} term encrypted with key K
SIGK{|t|} term signed with key K
Table 1
Syntax of the Protocol Programming Language - terms
stores where the messages are to be received, we use process calculus variables, and
a substitution mechanism expressed by simple reaction rules, corresponding to the
basic communication and computation operations. In comparison with conventional
process calculus, we needed a mechanism for identifying the principal executing a
sequence of actions, so that access to cryptographic keys could be identiﬁed and re-
stricted. The resulting process calculus provides a protocol execution model, based
on accepted concepts from process calculi, strand spaces and the chemical abstract
machine. Its formal components are as follows.
Terms
A basic algebra of terms t is assumed to be given. As usual, they are built
from constants c and variables x, by a given set of constructors p, which in this
case includes at least the tupling, the public key encryption ENCK{|t|}, and the
signature SIGK{|t|}. We assume enough typing to distinguish the keys K from the
principals Aˆ, the nonces n and so on. Each type is given with enough variables.
As usual, the computation is modelled as term evaluation. The closed terms,
that can be completely evaluated, are the contents of the messages exchanged in
protocols. The terms containing free variables (i.e. pointers and references) cannot
be sent. An example term is Xˆ, Yˆ ,m sent in the ﬁrst message of the CR protocol
(see Figure 1), it is important to note that Xˆ, Yˆ are parts of the message specifying
indented sender and the recipient rather than parameters to the send action.
For technical purposes, we make a distinction between basic terms u which
do not contain cryptographic operations explicitly (although, they may contain
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(actions) a ::=  the null action
send u send a term u
receive x receive term into variable x
new x generate new term x
match u/u match a term to a pattern
x := sign u,K sign the term u
verify u, u,K verify the signature
x := enc u,K encrypt the term u
x := dec u,K decrypt the term u
(strands) S ::= [a; . . . ; a]P
(roles) R ::= (x)S(t)
Table 2
Syntax of the Protocol Programming Language - actions, strands and roles
variables whose value is, for example, an encryption) and terms t which may contain
cryptographic primitives.
Names, keys, sessions and threads
We use Aˆ, Bˆ, . . . as names for protocol participants. We will overload the no-
tation and also use Aˆ, Bˆ, . . . as designation for public-private key pairs of the cor-
responding agents. A particular participant might be involved in more than one
session at a time. For example, agent Aˆ involved in the CR protocol might be
acting as an initiator in two sessions with agents Bˆ and Cˆ and as a responder in
another parallel session with Dˆ. For this reason, we will give names to sessions and
use A to designate a particular thread being executed by Aˆ.
Actions, strands and roles
The set of actions contains nonce generation, encryption, decryption, signature
generation and veriﬁcation, pattern matching, testing and communication steps
(sending and receiving). Pattern matching operator is used to construct and break
tuples and perform equality checks. We will often omit the pattern matching oper-
ator and perform matching implicitly. For example, in the description of the CR
protocol given in Figure 1 matching is implicitly done in the receive actions, if we
were to completely write out actions there would be a receive x action followed
by a match action analyzing the tuple, and performing the equality checks.
The list of actions will only contain basic terms which means that encryption
cannot be performed implicitly; explicit enc action has to be used instead. For
convenience, we assume that any variable will be assigned at most once, and the
ﬁrst occurrence of a particular variable has to be the assignment. Operational
semantics of such single-assignment language will be signiﬁcantly simpler as we can
model the assignment with term substitution.
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[receive x;S]X | [send t;T ]Y −→ [S(t/x)]X | [T ]Y(1)
[match p(t)/p(x);S]X −→ [S(t/x)]X(2)
[new x;S]X −→ [S(m/x)]X(3)
[x := enc t,K;S]X −→ [S(ENCK{|t|}/x)]X(4)
[x := dec ENCK{|t|},K;S]X −→ [S(t/x)]X(5)
[x := sign t,K;S]X −→ [S(SIGK{|t|}/x)]X(6)
[verify SIGK{|t|}, t,K;S]X −→ [S]X(7)
Where the following conditions must be satisﬁed:
(1) FV (t) = ∅
(2) m ∈ FV (C) ∪ FV (S), where C is the entire cord space
Table 3
Basic reaction steps
A strand is just a sequence of actions together with the designation of a thread
performing the actions. A role is a strand with input and output interfaces used
when performing sequential composition. All variables inside a role must be bound
either by the input interface or by other actions. A cord is just a strand with no
free variables, i.e. all ground terms are either constants or bound by a particular
action.
2.2 Execution Model
Cord Spaces
A cord space is a multiset of cords, each annotated in the subscript by the name
of the agent executing it. The multiset union is denoted by |, the empty multiset by
[]. The idea is that a cord space represents a group of processes ready to engage in
communication and distributed computation. Their operational behavior is deﬁned
by the reaction rules in Table 3.
The required side conditions for each reaction are shown below them. The
substitution (t/x) acts on the strand to the left. As usual, it is assumed that no free
variable becomes bound after substitution, which is achieved by renaming the bound
variables. Reaction (1) is a send and receive interaction, showing the simultaneous
sending of term t by the ﬁrst cord, with the receiving of t into variable x by the
second cord. We call this an external action because it involves an interaction
between two cords. The other reactions all take place within a single cord. We call
these internal actions.
Reaction (2) is a basic pattern match action, where the cord matches the pattern
p(t) with the expected pattern p(x), and substitutes t for x. Reaction (3) shows the
binding action where the cord creates a new value that doesn’t appear elsewhere
in the cordspace, and substitutes that value for x in the cord to the right. The
intuitive motive for the condition FV (t) = ∅ should be clear: a term cannot be
sent, or tested, until all of its free variables have been instantiated, so that it can be
evaluated. Also, when the new nonce is generated via the new action, it is required
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that the resulting constant is unique in the entire cord space.
Reactions (4) and (5) are the encryption and decryption actions respectively.
For example, the decryption action matches the pattern ENCK{|p(t)|} and sub-
stitutes t for x. Reactions (6) and (7) are the signature generation and signature
veriﬁcation actions respectively. As we already mentioned, since the assignment is
modelled via term substitution, a single variable can be assigned only once.
Protocols
A protocol Q is a set of roles {ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρk}, each executed by zero or more
honest principals in any run of Q. Intuitively, these roles may correspond to the
initiator, responder and the server, each speciﬁed by a sequence of actions to be
executed in a single instance of a role. A protocol participant is called a principal
and denoted by Aˆ, Bˆ, · · · etc. A single instance of a particular role executed by a
principal will be called a thread. All threads of a single principal share static data
such as long-term keys. This is formalized using static binding, described above.
As a notational convenience, we will use X to denote a thread of a principal Xˆ .
A private key is a key of form X, which represents the decryption key in a public
key cryptosystem. Private key X is only allowed to occur in the threads of principal
Xˆ . Moreover, it is only allowed to occur in the decryption pattern (corresponding to
a participant decrypting a message encrypted by its public key) and in the signature
construction (corresponding to a participant signing a message). These restrictions
prevent private keys from being sent in a message. While some useful protocols
might send private keys, we prevent roles from sending their private keys (in this
paper) since this allows us to take secrecy of private keys as an axiom, shortening
proofs of protocol properties.
Intruder roles
An attack is usually a process obtained by composing a protocol with another
process, in such a way that the resulting runs, projected to the protocol roles, do
not satisfy the protocol requirements. An attacker, or intruder, is a set of threads
sharing all data in an attack, and playing roles in one or more protocol sessions.
This intuition is captured in the deﬁnition of initial conﬁgurations below. The
actions available for building the intruder roles usually include receiving and sending
messages, decomposing them into parts, decrypting them by known keys, storing
data, and even generating new data. This is the standard “Dolev-Yao model”, which
appears to have developed from positions taken by Needham and Schroeder [61] and
a model presented by Dolev and Yao [28].
Buﬀer cord
Cords reactions, as we deﬁned them, model synchronous communication – a
message send action cannot happen in one cord unless a message receive action
happens simultaneously. Since real communication networks are asynchronous, we
need to introduce a buﬀer where sent messages can be stored until someone is ready
to receive them. In order to model this with cords we introduce a buﬀer cord
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[receive x; send x], it models a message being received and than eventually send.
We will require that all send and receive actions by principals and the intruder
are performed via buﬀer cords and assume that in every protocol there are enough
instances of the buﬀer cord to guarantee delivery of every message. Buﬀer cords
are a part of the infrastructure rather than a part of the protocol, we assume that
they are executed by special nameless agents. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, when we
refer to a thread, we mean a non-buﬀer thread, similarly, when we refer to an ac-
tion, we mean an action performed by a non-buﬀer thread. As demonstrated by [6],
this synchronous process calculus extended with buﬀers faithfully represents asyn-
chronous communication and corresponds to the usual deﬁnition of asynchronous
process calculus.
Conﬁgurations and runs
Initial conﬁguration of a protocol Q is determined by: (1) A set of principals,
some of which are designated as honest. (2) A cordspace constructed by assigning
roles of Q to threads of honest principals. (3) One or more intruder cords, which
may use keys of dishonest principals. (4) A ﬁnite number of buﬀer cords, enough
to accommodate every send action by honest threads and the intruder threads.
A run R is a sequence of reaction steps from the initial conﬁguration, subject to
constraint that every send/receive reaction step happens between some buﬀer cord
and some (non-buﬀer) thread. A particular initial conﬁguration may give rise to
many possible runs.
Events and traces
Since the protocol logic reasons about protocol runs, we need to introduce some
additional notation for them. An event is a ground substitution instance of an
action, i.e., an action in which all variables have been replaced by terms containing
only constants. An event represents the result of a reaction step, viewed from the
perspective of a single cord that participated in it. For example, if the thread A
sends message m (into a receiving buﬀer cord), then the event send m is a send
event of A. Alternatively, we can look at a run as a linear sequence of events starting
from an initial conﬁguration.
We use the following meta-notation to describe a reaction step of cord calculus:
EVENT (R,X,P, n, x) ≡
((
[PS]X | C −→ [S(n/x)]X | C
′
)
∈ R
)
When EVENT(R,X,P, n, x) holds we will say that in in run R, thread X executed
action P , receiving data n into variables x, where n and x are the same length.
A trace is a list of events by some thread in a run. We use R|X to denote the
events that occurred for thread X in run R. For a sequence of actions P , protocol
Q, run R and thread X, we say “P matches R|X” if R|X is precisely σP , where
σ is a substitution of values for variables. If P matches R|X using substitution σ,
then σ is called the matching substitution.
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2.2.1 Protocol properties
In this section we collect some properties of the protocols that will be useful in the
rest of the paper.
Lemma 2.1 (No Telepathy) Let Q be a protocol, R be an arbitrary run, and X be
a thread. Let m be any message sent by X as part of cord ρi. Then every symbol in
the term m is either generated in ρi, received in ρi, or was in the static interface of
ρi.
Proof. This follows from the deﬁnition of the cords we use to represent roles. Each
role is a closed cord, so all values must be bound. Symbols can be bound by the
static interface, or by the new , receive and pattern match actions. 
Lemma 2.2 (Asynchronous communication) In every run, any thread that wished
to send a message can always send it. Also, there is a strict linear order between
all external actions.
Proof. By deﬁnition, there are enough buﬀer cords in the initial conﬁguration to
provide a receive for every send action by a non-buﬀer thread. Since “external
action” refers to a send or a receive by a non-buﬀer thread, it follows from the
deﬁnition of a run that no two external actions can happen in the same step of the
run. 
Lemma 2.3 For every receive action there is a corresponding send action. More
formally, if in run R, thread X executed action receive x, receiving data m into
variable x then there exists a thread Y such that in the same run R thread Y executed
the send m action.
Proof. This follows from the deﬁnition of the basic cord calculus reaction steps
and the deﬁnition of the buﬀer cords. 
Lemma 2.4 For any initial conﬁguration C of protocol Q, and any run R, if prin-
cipal Xˆ ∈ HONEST(C), then for any thread X performed by principal Xˆ, R|X is
a trace of a single role of Q executed by Xˆ.
Proof. This follows from the deﬁnition of initial conﬁguration, which is constructed
by assigning roles to threads of honest principals. 
3 Protocol Logic
3.1 Syntax
The formulas of PCL are given by the grammar in Table 4, where S may be any
strand. Here, t and P denote a term and a thread, respectively. We use φ and ψ to
indicate predicate formulas, and m to indicate a generic term we call a “message”. A
message has the form (source, destination, protocol-identiﬁer, content), giving each
message source and destination ﬁelds and a unique protocol identiﬁer in addition
to the message contents. The source ﬁeld of a message may not identify the actual
sender of the message since the intruder can spoof the source address. Similarly, the
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Action formulas
a ::= Send(P, t) |Receive(P, t) |New(P, t) |Encrypt(P, t) |
Decrypt(P, t) |Sign(P, t) |Verify(P, t)
Formulas
φ ::= a | a < a |Has(P, t) |Fresh(P, t) |Gen(P, t) |FirstSend(P, t, t) |
Honest(N) | t = t |Contains(t, t) |φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | ∃x.φ |Start(P )
Modal formulas
Ψ ::= φ S φ
Table 4
Syntax of the logic
principal identiﬁed by the destination ﬁeld may not receive the message since the
intruder can intercept messages. Nonetheless, the source and destination ﬁelds in
the message may be useful for stating and proving authentication properties while
the protocol-identiﬁer is useful for proving properties of protocols.
Most protocol proofs use formulas of the form θ[P ]Xφ, which means that after
actions P are executed in thread X, starting from a state where formula θ is true,
formula φ is true about the resulting state of X. Here are the informal interpre-
tations of the predicates, with the precise semantics discussed in the next section.
Action formulas
Action formulas are used to state that particular actions have been performed
by various threads. Formula Send(X,m) means that principal Xˆ has send a message
m in the thread X. Predicates Receive,Encrypt,Sign, · · · etc. are similarly used to
state that the corresponding actions have been performed. Action predicates are
crucial in modelling authentication properties of the protocol. In PCL, a fact that
Aˆ has authenticated Bˆ will be described by saying that Bˆ must have performed
certain actions prescribed by the protocols.
Knowledge
Formula Has(X,x) means that principal Xˆ possesses information x in the thread
X. This is “possess” in the limited sense of having either generated the data or
received it in the clear or received it under encryption where the decryption key is
known. Formula Fresh(X, t) means that the term t generated in X is “fresh” in the
sense that no one else has seen any term containing t as a subterm. Typically, a
fresh term will be a nonce and freshness will be used to reason about the temporal
ordering of actions in runs of a protocol. Formula Gen(X, t) means that the term
t originated in the thread X in the sense that it was “fresh” in X at some point.
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Formula Contains(t1, t2) means that the term t1 contains term t2 as a subterm.
Predicate Has can be used to model secrecy properties, for example, a fact that
a term t is a shared secret between threads X and Y is captured by the logical
formula ∀Z.Has(Z, t) ⊃ (Z = X ∨ Z = Y ).
Temporal ordering
Formula Start(X) means that the thread X did not execute any actions in the
past. Formula, a1 < a2 means that both actions a1 and a2 happened in the run
and moreover, that the action a2 happened after the action a1. Note that actions
may not be unique. For example, a thread X might have received the same term
multiple times, temporal ordering operator only states that some two actions a1 and
a2 have happened in that order. Formula FirstSend(P, t, t
′) means that the thread
P has send a term t (possibly as a part of some bigger message) and that the ﬁrst
such occurrence was an action when P send the message t′. Temporal ordering rela-
tion can be used to strengthen the authentication properties by imposing ordering
between actions of diﬀerent participants.
Honesty
Formula Honest(Xˆ) means the actions of principal Xˆ in the current run are
precisely an interleaving of initial segments of traces of a set of roles of the protocol.
In other words, each thread X of principal Xˆ assumes a particular role of the
protocol and does exactly the actions prescribed by that role.
Modal Formulas
Modal formulas attach assertions – preconditions and postconditions – to pro-
grams. Informally, formula of the form θ[P ]Xφ means that after actions P are
executed in thread X, starting from a state where formula θ is true, formula φ is
true about the resulting state of X.
3.2 Semantics
A formula may be true or false at a run of a protocol. More precisely, the main
semantic relation, Q, R |= φ, may be read, “formula φ holds for run R of protocol
Q.” In this relation, R may be a complete run, with all sessions that are started in
the run completed, or an incomplete run with some principals waiting for additional
messages to complete one or more sessions. If Q is a protocol, then let Q¯ be the
set of all initial conﬁgurations of protocol Q, each including a possible intruder
cord. Let Runs(Q) be the set of all runs of protocol Q with intruder, each beginning
from an initial conﬁguration in Q¯ sequence of reaction steps within a cord space.
If φ has free variables, then Q, R |= φ if we have Q, R |= σφ for all substitutions
σ that eliminate all the free variables in φ. We write Q |= φ if Q, R |= φ for all
R ∈ Runs(Q).
The inductive deﬁnition of Q, R |= φ is given below. Because a run is a sequence
of reaction steps, each step resulting from a principal executing an action, is possible
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to assert whether a particular action occurred in a given run and also to make
assertions about the temporal ordering of the actions. An alternative view, similar
to the execution model used in deﬁning Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) semantics, is
to think of a run as a linear sequence of states. Transition from one state to the
next is eﬀected by an action carried out by some thread in some role.
Action Formulas
Action formulas hold as a result of a thread executing a particular action in the
run. Semantics of corresponding predicates is deﬁned in a straightforward fashion;
a particular action predicate holds in the run if the corresponding action happened
in the run with the same terms as parameters.
Q, R |= Send(A,m) if in the run R, thread A executed action send m.
Q, R |= Receive(A,m) if there exists a variable x such that in the run R, thread A
executed action receive x, receiving data m into variable x.
Q, R |= New(A,m) if there exists a variable x such that in the run R, thread A
executed action new x, receiving data m into variable x.
Q, R |= Encrypt(A,ENCK{|m|}) if there exists a variable x such that in the run R,
thread A executed action x := enc m,K, receiving data ENCK{|m|} into variable
x.
Q, R |= Decrypt(A,ENCK{|m|}) if there exists a variable x such that in the run R,
thread A executed action x := dec ENCK{|m|},K, receiving data m into variable
x.
Q, R |= Sign(A,SIGK{|m|}) if there exists a variable x such that in the run R,
thread A executed action x := sign m,K, receiving data SIGK{|m|} into variable
x.
Q, R |= Verify(A,SIGK{|m|}) if in the run R, thread A executed the signature ver-
iﬁcation action verify SIGK{|m|},K.
Predicate Has
We model knowledge using the predicate Has. Intuition behind the semantics
deﬁnition for this predicate is simple, Has should hold for terms that are known
directly, either as a free variable of the rule or as a result of receiving or generating
a term. Furthermore, Has should hold for all terms that can be obtained from terms
known directly via one or more “Dolev-Yao” operations (decomposing via pattern
matching, or decryption with a known key or composing via encryption or tupling).
Q, R |= Has(A,m) if there exists an i such that Hasi(A,m) where Hasi is inductively
as follows:
Has0(A,m) if m ∈ FV (R|A)
Has0(A,m) if EVENT (R,A, (new x),m, x)
Has0(A,m) if EVENT (R,A, (receive x),m, x)
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Hasi+1(A,m) if Hasi(A,m)
Hasi+1(A, (m,m
′)) if Hasi(A,m) and Hasi(A,m
′)
Hasi+1(A,m) if Hasi(A, (m,m
′)) or Hasi(A, (m
′,m))
Hasi+1(A,ENCK{|m|}) if Hasi(A,m) and Hasi(A,K)
Hasi+1(A,m) if Hasi(A,ENCK{|m|}) and Hasi(A,K)
Hasi+1(A,m) if Hasi(A,m
′) and m′ = p(m)
and EVENT (R,A, (match m′/p(y)),m, y)
Other Formulas
Q, R |= Start(A) if R|A is empty. Intuitively this formula means that A didn’t
execute any actions in the past.
Q, R |= Fresh(A, t) if Q, R |= New(A, t) holds and furthermore for all m such that
Q, R |= Send(A,m) it holds that t is not a subterm of m.
Q, R |= Gen(A, t) if there is a preﬁx R′ of R such that Q, R′ |= Fresh(A, t) holds.
Q, R |= FirstSend(A, t, t′) if t is a subterm of t′, Q, R |= Send(A, t′) holds and for all
preﬁxes R′ of R and all terms t′′ such that t ⊆ t′′ and Q, R′ |= Send(A, t′′) it has
to be that Q, R′ |= Send(A, t′).
Q, R |= Honest(Aˆ) if Aˆ ∈ HONEST (C) in initial conﬁguration C for R and all
threads of Aˆ are in a “pausing” state in R. More precisely, R|
Aˆ
is an interleaving
of basic sequences of roles in Q.
Q, R |= Contains(t1, t2) if t2 ⊆ t1, where ⊆ is the subterm relation between terms.
Q, R |= (φ1 ∧ φ2) if Q, R |= φ1 and Q, R |= φ2
Q, R |= ¬φ if Q, R |= φ
Q, R |= ∃x.φ if Q, R |= (d/x)φ, for some d, where (d/x)φ denotes the formula ob-
tained by substituting d for x in φ.
Modal Formulas
Q, R |= φ1[P ]Aφ2 if R = R0R1R2, for some R0, R1 and R2, and either P does not
match R1|A or P matches R1|A and Q, R0 |= σφ1 implies Q, R0R1 |= σφ2, where
σ is the substitution matching P to R1|A.
4 Proof System
The proof system combines a complete axiom system for ﬁrst-order logic (not listed
since any axiomatization will do), together with axioms and proof rules for protocol
actions, temporal reasoning, and a specialized form of invariance rule.
4.1 Axioms for Protocol Actions
Axioms for protocol actions state properties that hold in the state as a result of
executing certain actions (or not executing certain actions). We use a in the axioms
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to denote any one of the actions and a to denote the corresponding predicate in
the logic.  denotes the boolean value true. Axiom AA1 states that if a principal
has executed an action in some role, then the corresponding predicate asserting
that the action had occurred in the past is true while AA2 states that at the
start of a thread any action predicate applied to the thread is false. Axiom AA3
states that the predicate asserting thread X has not sent the term t remains false
after any action that does not send a term that uniﬁes with t, if it is false before
the action. AA4 states that after thread X does actions a, · · · , b in sequence, the
action predicates, a and b, corresponding to the actions, are temporally ordered in
the same sequence.
AA1 [a]X a
AA2 Start(X)[ ]X ¬a(X)
AA3 ¬Send(X, t)[b]X¬Send(X, t)
if σSend(X, t) = σb for all substitutions σ
AA4 [a; · · · ; b]Xa < b
The following axioms deal with properties of freshly generated nonces. Axiom
AN1 states that a particular nonce is generated by a unique thread. If thread X
generates a new value n and does no further actions, then axiom AN2 says that no
one else knows n, and axiom AN3 says that n is fresh, and axiom AN4 says that
X is the originating thread of nonce n.
AN1 New(X,x) ∧ New(Y, x) ⊃ X = Y
AN2 [new x]X Has(Y, x) ⊃ (Y = X)
AN3 [new x]X Fresh(X,x)
AN4 Fresh(X,x) ⊃ Gen(X,x)
4.2 Possession Axioms
The possession axioms characterize the terms that a principal can derive if it pos-
sesses certain other terms. ORIG and REC state respectively that a principal
possesses a term if she freshly generated it (a nonce) or if she received it in some
message. TUP and ENC enable construction of tuples and encrypted terms if
the parts are known. PROJ and DEC allow decomposition of a tuple into its
components and decryption of an encrypted term if the key is known.
ORIG New(X,x) ⊃ Has(X,x)
REC Receive(X,x) ⊃ Has(X,x)
TUP Has(X,x) ∧ Has(X, y) ⊃ Has(X, (x, y))
ENC Has(X,x) ∧ Has(X,K) ⊃ Has(X,ENCK{|x|})
PROJ Has(X, (x, y)) ⊃ Has(X,x) ∧ Has(X, y)
DEC Has(X,ENCK{|x|}) ∧ Has(X,K) ⊃ Has(X,x)
Axioms AR1, AR2 and AR3 are used to model obtaining information about
structure of terms as they are being parsed. They allow us to plug in appropriate
A. Datta et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 172 (2007) 311–358326
substitutions obtained by matching, signature veriﬁcation and decryption actions
to terms inside the action predicate a.
AR1 a(x)[match q(x)/q(t)]X a(t)
AR2 a(x)[verify x, t,K]X a(SIGK{|t|})
AR3 a(x)[y := dec x,K]X a(ENCK{|y|})
4.3 Encryption and Signature
The next two axioms are aimed at capturing the black-box model of encryption
and signature. Axiom VER refers to the unforgeability of signatures while axiom
SEC stipulates the need to possess the private key in order to decrypt a message
encrypted with the corresponding public key.
SEC Honest(Xˆ) ∧Decrypt(Y,ENC
Xˆ
{|x|}) ⊃ (Yˆ = Xˆ)
VER Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Verify(Y, SIG
Xˆ
{|x|}) ∧ Xˆ = Yˆ ⊃
∃X.Send(X,m) ∧ Contains(m,SIG
Xˆ
{|x|})
4.4 Generic Rules
These are generic Floyd-Hoare style rules for reasoning about program pre-conditions
and post-conditions. For example, the generalization rule G4 says that if φ is a valid
formula (it holds in all runs of all protocols) then it can be used in a postcondition
of any modal form.
θ[P ]Xφ θ[P ]Xψ
θ[P ]Xφ ∧ ψ
G1
θ[P ]Xψ φ[P ]Xψ
θ ∨ φ[P ]Xψ
G2
θ′ ⊃ θ θ[P ]Xφ φ ⊃ φ
′
θ′[P ]Xφ
′ G3
φ
θ[P ]Xφ
G4
4.5 Sequencing Rule
Sequencing rule gives us a way of sequentially composing two cords P and P ′ when
post-condition of P , matches the pre-condition of P ′.
φ1[P ]Xφ2 φ2[P
′]Xφ3
φ1[PP
′]Xφ3
S1
4.6 Preservation Axioms
The following axioms state that the truth of certain predicates continue to hold
after further actions. P1 states this for the predicates Has,FirstSend, a whereas P2
states that freshness of a term holds across actions that do not send out some term
containing it.
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P1 Persist(X, t)[a]XPersist(X, t)
for Persist ∈ {Has,FirstSend, a,Gen}.
P2 Fresh(X, t)[a]XFresh(X, t)
where t ⊆ a.
4.7 Axioms and Rules for Temporal Ordering
The next two axioms give us a way of deducing temporal ordering between actions
of diﬀerent threads. Informally, FirstSend(X, t, t′) says that a thread X generated
a fresh term t and sent it out ﬁrst in message t′. This refers to the ﬁrst such send
event and is formally captured by axiom FS1. Axiom FS2 lets us reason that if a
thread Y does some action with a term t′′, which contains a term t, ﬁrst sent inside
a term t′ by a thread X as a subterm, then that send must have occurred before
Y ’s action.
FS1 Fresh(X, t)[send t′]XFirstSend(X, t, t
′)
where t ⊆ t′.
FS2 FirstSend(X, t, t′) ∧ a(Y, t′′) ⊃ Send(X, t′) < a(Y, t′′)
where X = Y and t ⊆ t′′.
4.8 The Honesty Rule
The honesty rule is an invariance rule for proving properties about the actions of
principals that execute roles of a protocol, similar in spirit to the basic invariance
rule of LTL [47] and invariance rules in other logics of programs. The honesty
rule is often used to combine facts about one role with inferred actions of other
roles. For example, suppose Alice receives a signed response from a message sent to
Bob. Alice may use facts about Bob’s role to infer that Bob must have performed
certain actions before sending his reply. This form of reasoning may be sound if
Bob is honest, since honest, by deﬁnition in our framework, means “follows one
or more roles of the protocol.” The assumption that Bob is honest is essential
because the intruder may perform arbitrary actions with any key that has been
compromised. Since we have added preconditions to the protocol logic presented
in [29,30], we reformulate the rule here is a more convenient form using preconditions
and postconditions.
To a ﬁrst approximation, the honesty rule says that if a property holds before
each role starts, and the property is preserved by any sequence of actions that an
honest principal may perform, then the property holds for every honest principal.
An example property that can be proved by this method is that if a principal sends a
signed message of a certain form, the principal must have received a request for this
response. The proof of a property like this depends on the protocol, of course. For
this reason, the antecedent of the honesty rule includes a set of formulas constructed
from the set of roles of the protocol in a systematic way. A subtle issue is that
the honesty rule only involves certain points in a protocol execution. This is not a
fundamental limitation in the nature of invariants, but the result of a design tradeoﬀ
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that was made in formulating the rule. More speciﬁcally, it is natural to assume
that once a thread receives a message, the thread may continue to send messages
and perform internal actions until the thread needs to pause to wait for additional
input. Another way to regard this assumption is that we do not give the attacker
control over the scheduling of internal actions or the point at which messages are
sent. The attacker only has control over the network, not local computing. We
therefore formulate our honesty rule to prove properties that hold in every pausing
state of every honest rule. By considering fewer states, we consider more invariants
true. By analogy with database transactions, for example, we consider a property
an invariant if it holds after every “transaction” is completed, allowing roles to
temporarily violate invariants as long as they preserve them before pausing. A
similar convention is normally associated with loop invariants: a property is a loop
invariant if it holds every time the top of the loop is reached; it is not necessary
that the invariant hold at every point in the body of the loop.
Recall that a protocol Q is a set of roles {ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρk}, each executed by zero
or more honest principals in any run of Q. A sequence P of actions is a basic
sequence of role ρ, written P ∈ BS(ρ), if P is a contiguous subsequence of ρ such
that either (i) P starts at the beginning of ρ and ends with the last action before
the ﬁrst receive, or (ii) P starts with a receive action and continues up to the last
action before the next receive, or (iii) P starts with the last receive action of the
role and continues through the end of the role. In the syntactic presentation below,
we use the notation ∀ρ ∈ Q. ∀P ∈ BS(ρ). φ[P ]Xφ to denote a ﬁnite set of formulas
of the form φ[P ]Xφ - one for each basic sequence P in the protocol. The quantiﬁers
∀ρ ∈ Q and ∀P ∈ BS(ρ) are not part of the syntax of PCL, but are meta-notation
used to state this rule schema.
Start(X)[ ]X φ ∀ρ ∈ Q.∀P ∈ BS(ρ). φ [P ]X φ
Honest(Xˆ) ⊃ φ
HONQ
no free variable in φ
except X bound in
[P ]X
4.9 Soundness
The soundness theorem for this proof system is proved, by induction on the length
of proofs, in Appendix B. Here we state the soundness theorem and demonstrate
proofs for a few relevant proof rules and axioms. We write Γ  γ if γ is provable
from the formulas in Γ and any axiom or inference rule of the proof system except
the honesty rule (HONQ for any protocol Q). We write Γ Q γ if γ is provable
from the formulas in Γ, the basic axioms and inference rules of the proof system
and the honesty rule for protocol Q (i.e., HONQ but not HONQ′ for any Q
′ = Q).
Here γ is either a modal formula or a basic formula (i.e., of the syntactic form Ψ or
φ in Table 4).
Theorem 4.1 If Γ Q γ, then Γ |=Q γ. Furthermore, if Γ  γ, then Γ |= γ.
Axiom VER
Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Verify(Y, SIG
Xˆ
{|x|}) ∧ Xˆ = Yˆ ⊃
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∃X.Send(X,m) ∧ Contains(m,SIG
Xˆ
{|x|})
Informally, VER says that if an agent Xˆ is honest, and some thread Y executed
by principal Yˆ has veriﬁed a signature SIGX{|x|} (i.e. a message signed with Xˆ ’s
private key), then Xˆ must have sent the signature out in some thread X, as a part
of some message. In other words, when Xˆ is honest, he is the only one who can
sign messages with his public key. Therefore, every message signed by Xˆ must have
originated from some thread X performed by principal Xˆ.
Let Q be a protocol, and C be an initial conﬁguration of Q such that Xˆ ∈
HONEST (C). Suppose that R is a run of Q starting from C, such that Q, R |=
Verify(Y, SIGX{|x|}) for a thread Y such that Yˆ = Xˆ. By the deﬁnition of the exe-
cution model, when Xˆ ∈ HONEST (C), only threads of Xˆ can construct signatures
with Xˆ’s private key. Since, Xˆ = Yˆ , by Lemma 2.1 it has to be that the thread Y
received term SIGX{|x|} as a part of some message m
′, i.e. there exists a term m′
such that EVENT (R,Y, (x),m′, x) and SIGX{|x|} ⊆ m
′. By Lemma 2.3 there is a
corresponding send action for every receive, hence there exists a thread Z such that
EVENT (R,Z, send m, ∅, ∅) is true. Therefore, there exists at least one action in the
run R where SIGX{|x|} is sent as a part of some message. Let R
′ be a shortest preﬁx
of R such that, for some thread Z and for some term m such that SIGX{|x|} ⊆ m,
it is true that EVENT(R′, Z, send m, ∅, ∅). By Lemma 2.1 SIGX{|x|} has to be
either received or generated by Z, since R′ is the shortest run in which SIGX{|x|}
is sent out as a part of some message it has to be that the thread Z generated
SIGX{|x|}. By the deﬁnition of the execution model, and honesty of Xˆ it follows
that Z is a thread of Xˆ. Now, Q,R |= Send(Z,m) ∧ Contains(m,SIGZ{|n|})) holds
by the semantics of the action predicates and Lemma 2.2.
Sequencing rule
Sequencing rule S1 (see Section 4.5) gives us a way of sequentially composing
two cords P and P ′ when post-condition of P , matches the pre-condition or P ′.
Assume that for all protocols Q and runs R of Q both Q, R |= φ1[P ]Aφ2 and
Q, R |= φ2[P
′]Aφ3 hold. We need to prove that Q, R |= φ1[PP
′]Aφ3 for all Q and
R. Let Q be a protocol and R a run of Q such that R = R0R1R2, assume that
R1|A matches PP
′ under substitution σ, and Q,R0 |= σφ1. Run R can be written
as R = R0R
′
1R
′′
1R2 where R
′
1|A matches P under σ and R
′′
1 |A matches P
′ under σ.
It follows that Q,R0R
′
1 |= σφ2 and therefore Q, R0R
′
1R
′′
1 |= σφ3.
The Honesty rule
The honesty rule (see Section 4.8) is an invariance rule for inductively proving
properties about the actions of principals that execute protocol roles. Assume
that Q is a protocol and R is a run of Q such that Q, R |= Start(X)[ ]Xφ and
Q, R |= φ [P ]X φ for all roles ρ ∈ Q and for all basic sequences P ∈ BS(ρ). We
must show that Q, R |= Honest(Xˆ) ⊃ φ. Assume Q, R |= Honest(Xˆ). Then by the
semantics of predicate “Honest” and Lemma 2.4, it has to be that R|X is a trace of
a role of Q carried out by X and, moreover, thread X has to be in a pausing state
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at the end of R. Therefore a R|X is a concatenation of basic sequences of Q. Now,
Q, R |= φ follows from the soundness of sequencing rule S1.
5 Example
In this section, we use the protocol logic to formally prove the authentication prop-
erty of the three-way signature based challenge-response protocol (CR) described in
Section 2. Our formulation of authentication is based on the concept of matching
conversations [8] and is similar to the idea of proving authentication using corre-
spondence assertions [77]. The same basic idea is also presented in [27] where it
is referred to as matching records of runs. Simply put, it requires that whenever
Alice and Bob accept each other’s identities at the end of a run, their records of the
run match, i.e., each message that Alice sent was received by Bob and vice versa,
each send event happened before the corresponding receive event, and moreover the
messages sent by each principal appear in the same order in both the records. Here
we demonstrate the authentication property only for the initiator in the protocol,
proof for the responder can be carried out along the same lines.
Weak authentication
First we show a weaker authentication property. If Alice has completed the
initiator role of the protocol, apparently with Bob then Bob was involved in the
protocol – he received the ﬁrst message and sent out the corresponding second
message. The formal property proved about the initiator role is
QCR [InitCR]XHonest(Yˆ ) ∧ Yˆ = Xˆ ⊃ φweak−auth.
The actions in the modal formula are the actions of the initiator role of CR, given
in Section 2. The precondition imposes constraints on the free variables. In this
example, the precondition is simply “true”. The postcondition captures the security
property that is guaranteed by executing the actions starting from a state where
the precondition holds. In this speciﬁc example, the postcondition is a formula
capturing the notion of weak authentication. Intuitively, this formula means that
after executing the actions in the initiator role purportedly with Yˆ , Xˆ is guaranteed
that Yˆ was involved in the protocol at some point (purportedly with Xˆ), provided
that Yˆ is honest (meaning that she always faithfully executes some role of the CR
protocol and does not, for example, send out her private keys).
φweak−auth ≡ ∃Y. (Receive(Y, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m)) < Send(Y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIGYˆ {|y,m, Xˆ |})))
A formal proof of the weak authentication property for the initiator guaranteed
by executing the CR protocol is presented in Table 5. First order logic reasoning
steps as well as applications of the generic rules are omitted for clarity. Details for
the application of the honesty rule are postponed until later in this Section. The
formal proof naturally breaks down into three parts:
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AA1 [verify s, (y,m, Xˆ), Yˆ ]XVerify(X,SIGYˆ {|y,m, Xˆ |})(8)
8,P1,SEQ [InitCR]XVerify(X,SIGYˆ {|y,m, Xˆ |})(9)
9,VER [InitCR]X∃Y, t. Send(Y, t) ∧ Contains(t, SIGYˆ {|y,m, Xˆ |})(10)
HONQCR (Honest(Yˆ ) ∧ Send(Y, t) ∧ Contains(t, SIGYˆ {|y,m, Xˆ |})) ⊃(11)
(New(Y,m) ∨
(Receive(Y, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m)) < Send(Y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |}))))
10, 11 [InitCR]XHonest(Yˆ ) ⊃ (∃Y. New(Y,m) ∨(12)
(Receive(Y, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m)) < Send(Y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |}))))
AA1 [new m]XNew(X, y)(13)
13,P1,SEQ[InitCR]XNew(X, y)(14)
12, 14,AN1 [InitCR]XHonest(Yˆ ) ∧ Yˆ = Xˆ ⊃ (∃Y.(15)
Receive(Y, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m)) < Send(Y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |})))
Table 5
Weak authentication for the initiator role of the CR protocol
• Lines (8)–(10) assert what actions were executed by Alice in the initiator role.
Speciﬁcally, in this part of the proof, it is proved that Alice has received and
veriﬁed Bob’s signature SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |}. We then use the fact that the signatures
of honest parties are unforgeable (axiom VER), to conclude that Bob must have
sent out some message containing his signature.
• In lines (11)–(12), the honesty rule is used to infer that whenever Bob generates a
signature of this form, he has either generated the nonce m (acting as an initiator)
or he sent it to Alice as part of the second message of the protocol and must have
previously received the ﬁrst message from Alice (acting as a responder).
• Finally, in lines (13)–(15), we reason again about actions executed by Alice in
order to deduce that the nonce m could not have been created by Bob. Therefore,
combining the assertions, we show that the weak authentication property holds:
If Alice has completed the protocol as an initiator, apparently with Bob, then
Bob must have received the ﬁrst message (apparently from Alice) and sent the
second message to Alice.
Strong authentication
To obtain the stronger authentication property we need to assert temporal order-
ing between actions of Alice and Bob. As mentioned before, the ﬁnal authentication
property should state that: each message Xˆ sent was received by Yˆ and vice versa,
each send event happened before the corresponding receive event, and moreover the
messages sent by each principal (Xˆ or Yˆ ) appear in the same order in both the
records. Similarly as before, the formal property proved about the initiator role is
QCR [InitCR]XHonest(Yˆ ) ∧ Yˆ = Xˆ ⊃ φauth, but φauth now models the stronger
property:
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AN3 [new m]XFresh(X,m)(16)
FS1 Fresh(X,m)[send Xˆ, Yˆ ,m]XFirstSend(X,m, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m))(17)
16, 17,SEQ,P1 [InitCR]XFirstSend(X,m, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m))(18)
18,FS2 [InitCR]XReceive(Y, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m)) ∧ Yˆ = Xˆ ⊃(19)
Send(X, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m)) < Receive(Y, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m))
HONQCR (Honest(Yˆ ) ∧ Receive(Y, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m)) ∧(20)
Send(Y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |}))) ⊃
FirstSend(Y, y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |}))
AA1,AR2,SEQ[InitCR]XReceive(X, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIGYˆ {|y,m, Xˆ |}))(21)
20, 21,FS2 [InitCR]XHonest(Yˆ ) ∧ Yˆ = Xˆ ∧(22)
Receive(Y, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m)) ∧
Send(Y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |})) ⊃
Send(Y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |})) <
Receive(X, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |}))
AA4,P1 [InitCR]XReceive(X, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIGYˆ {|y,m, Xˆ |})) <(23)
Send(X, (Xˆ, Yˆ , SIG
Xˆ
{|y,m, Yˆ |}))
15, 19, 22, 23 [InitCR]XHonest(Yˆ ) ∧ Yˆ = Xˆ ⊃ φauth(24)
Table 6
Strong authentication for the initiator role of the CR protocol
φauth ≡∃Y. ((Send(X,msg1) < Receive(Y,msg1)) ∧
(Receive(Y,msg1) < Send(Y,msg2)) ∧
(Send(Y,msg2) < Receive(X,msg2)) ∧
(Receive(X,msg2) < Send(X,msg3)))
Here, we are usingmsg1, msg2 and msg3 as shortcuts for the corresponding messages
in the protocol: msg1 ≡ (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m), msg2 ≡ (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIGYˆ {|y,m, Xˆ |}), msg3 ≡
(Xˆ, Yˆ , SIG
Xˆ
{|y,m, Yˆ |}). Note that we cannot deduce that the responder Y has
received the third message as that property does not necessarily hold from the
point of view of the initiator.
A formal proof of the strong authentication property for the initiator guaranteed
by executing the CR protocol is presented in Table 6. Again, the formal proof
naturally breaks down into three parts:
• Lines (16)–(19) reason about actions executed by Alice in the initiator role.
Speciﬁcally, it is proved that the ﬁrst occurrence of the nonce m on the net-
work is in the ﬁrst message send by Alice. Hence, all actions involving that nonce
must happen after that send action.
• In lines (20)–(22), the honesty rule is used to infer the symmetrical property
about Bob’s nonce y. Hence, all actions involving that nonce must happen after
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the send action by Bob in the second step of the protocol.
• In line (23) we reason from Alice’s actions that she sent out the third message
after receiving the second message.
• Finally, in line (24), the weak authentication property already proved is com-
bined with the newly established temporal assertions to infer the ﬁnal strong
authentication property.
The proofs together are an instance of a general method for proving authentica-
tion results in the protocol logic. In proving that Alice, after executing the initiator
role of a protocol purportedly with Bob, is indeed assured that she communicated
with Bob, we usually follow these 3 steps:
(i) Prove the order in which Alice executed her send-receive actions. This is done
by examining the actions in Alice’s role.
(ii) Assuming Bob is honest, infer the order in which Bob carried out his send-
receive actions. This is done in two steps. First, use properties of cryptographic
primitives (like signing and encryption) to conclude that only Bob could have
executed a certain action (e.g., generate his signature). Then use the honesty
rule to establish a causal relationship between that identifying action and other
actions that Bob always does whenever he executes that action (e.g, send msg2
to Alice after having received msg1 from her).
(iii) Finally, use the temporal ordering rules to establish an ordering between the
send-receive actions of Alice and Bob. The causal ordering between messages
sent by the peers is typically established by exploiting the fact that messages
contain fresh data.
Proofs in the logic are therefore quite insightful. The proof structure often
follows a natural language argument, similar to one that a protocol designer might
use to convince herself of the correctness of a protocol.
Invariants
In both proofs the honesty rule is used to deduce that the other party in the
protocol has performed certain actions or not. Formulas proved by the application of
the honesty rule are called invariants and will play a crucial role in the composition
method described in Section 6. This proof uses two invariants Honest(Yˆ ) ⊃ γ1 and
Honest(Yˆ ) ⊃ γ2 where γ1 and γ2 are given by:
γ1≡ Send(Y, t) ∧ Contains(t, SIGYˆ {|y,m, Xˆ |})) ⊃
(Gen(Y,m) ∨
(Receive(Y, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m)) < Send(Y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |}))))
γ2≡ (Receive(Y, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m)) ∧ Send(Y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIGYˆ {|y,m, Xˆ |}))) ⊃
FirstSend(Y, y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |}))
As described in Section 4.8, the honesty rule depends on the protocol being ana-
lyzed. Recall that the protocol QCR is just a set of roles QCR = {InitCR,RespCR}
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each specifying a sequence of actions to be executed. The set of basic sequences of
protocol QCR is given below.
BS1 ≡ [new m; send Xˆ, Yˆ ,m; ]X
BS2 ≡ [receive Yˆ , Xˆ, y, s; verify s, (y,m, Xˆ), Yˆ ;
r := sign (y,m, Yˆ ), Xˆ ; send Xˆ, Yˆ , r; ]X
BS3 ≡ [receive Xˆ, Yˆ , x; new n; r := sign (n, x, Xˆ), Yˆ ; send Yˆ , Xˆ, n, r; ]Y
BS4 ≡ [receive Xˆ, Yˆ , t; verify t, (n, x, Yˆ ), Xˆ ; ]Y
Therefore to apply the honesty rule we need to show that the invariants (γ1,
γ2) are preserved by all the basic sequences (BS1, . . . , BS4). These proofs are
straightforward and we omit them here.
6 Protocol Composition
In this section, we explain sequential and parallel composition of protocols as syn-
tactic operations on cords and present associated methods for proving protocol
properties compositionally. Recall that a protocol is deﬁned as a ﬁnite set of cords,
one for each role of the protocol.
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Parallel Composition) The parallel composition Q1 | Q2 of proto-
cols Q1 and Q2 is the union of the sets of cords Q1 and Q2.
For example, consider the protocol obtained by parallel composition of SSL 2.0
and SSL 3.0. The deﬁnition above allows an honest principal to simultaneously
engage in sessions of the two protocols. Clearly, a property proved about either
protocol individually might no longer hold when the two are run in parallel, since
an adversary might use information acquired by executing one protocol to attack
the other. Formally, some step in the logical proof of the protocol property is
no longer correct. Since all the axioms and inference rules in Section 4 hold for
all protocols, the only formulas used in the proof which might no longer be valid
are those proved using the honesty rule, i.e., the protocol invariants. In order
to guarantee that the security properties of the individual protocols are preserved
under parallel composition, it is therefore suﬃcient to verify that each protocol
respects the invariants of the other. This observation suggests the following four-
step methodology for proving properties of the parallel composition of two protocols.
(i) Prove separately the security properties of protocols Q1 and Q2.
Q1 Ψ1 and Q2 Ψ2
(ii) Identify the set of invariants used in the two proofs, Γ1 and Γ2. The formulas
included in these sets will typically be the formulas in the two proofs, that
were proved using the honesty rule. The proofs from the previous step can
be decomposed into two parts—the ﬁrst part proves the protocol invariants
using the honesty rule for the protocol, while the second proves the protocol
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property using the invariants as hypotheses, but without using the honesty
rule. Formally,
Q1 Γ1 and Γ1  Ψ1 and Q2 Γ2 and Γ2  Ψ2
(iii) Notice that it is possible to weaken the hypotheses to Γ1 ∪ Γ2. The proof of
the protocol properties is clearly preserved under a larger set of assumptions.
Γ1 ∪ Γ2  Ψ1 and Γ1 ∪ Γ2  Ψ2
(iv) Prove that the invariants, Γ1 ∪ Γ2, hold for both the protocols. This step uses
the transitivity of entailment in the logic: if Q Γ and Γ  γ, then Q γ. Since
Q1 Γ1 was already proved in Step 1 - in this step it is suﬃcient to show that
Q1 Γ2 and similarly that Q2 Γ1. By Lemma 6.2 below, we therefore have
Q1|Q2 Γ1 ∪ Γ2. From this and the formulas from step 3, we can conclude
that the security properties of Q1 and Q2 are preserved under their parallel
composition.
Q1|Q2 Ψ1 and Q1|Q2 Ψ2
Lemma 6.2 If Q1 ψ and Q2 ψ, then Q1|Q2 ψ, where the last step in the proof
of ψ in both Q1 and Q2 uses the honesty rule and no previous step uses the honesty
rule.
Proof. Following the conclusion of the honesty rule, ψ must be of the form Honest(Xˆ)
⊃ φ for some formula φ. Suppose that the formula Honest(Xˆ) ⊃ φ can be proved
for both Q1 and Q2 using the honesty rule. By the deﬁnition of the honesty rule,
it has to be that  Start(X)[]Xφ and ∀ρ ∈ Q1 ∪ Q2.∀PBS(ρ).  φ [P ]X φ. Every
basic sequence P of a role in Q1 | Q2 is a basic sequence of a role in Q1, or a
basic sequence of a role in Q2. It follows that  φ [P ]X φ and, therefore, by the
application of the honesty rule, Q1|Q2 Honest(Xˆ) ⊃ φ. 
Theorem 6.3 If Q1 Γ and Γ  Ψ and Q2 Γ, then Q1|Q2 Ψ.
Deﬁnition 6.4 (Sequential Composition of Cords) Given cords
r = (x0 . . . x−1)[R]X(u0 . . . um−1),
s = (y0 . . . ym−1)[S]Y (t0 . . . tn−1),
their sequential composition is deﬁned by
r; s = (x0 . . . x−1)[RS
′]X(t
′
0 . . . t
′
n−1),
where S′ and t′i are the substitution instances of S and ti respectively, such that
each variable yk is replaced by the term uk. Furthermore, under this substitution,
Y is mapped to X. Variables are renamed so that free variables of S, tj and uk do
not become bound in r; s. RS′ is the strand obtained by concatenating the actions
in R with those in S′.
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Deﬁnition 6.5 (Sequential Composition) A protocol Q is the sequential compo-
sition of two protocols Q1 and Q2 if each role of Q is obtained by the sequential
composition of a cord of Q1 with a cord of Q2.
It is clear that the sequential composition of protocols does not yield a unique
result. Typically, when we sequentially compose protocols we have a speciﬁc com-
position of roles in mind. For example, if we compose two two-party protocols, we
might compose the corresponding initiator and responder roles.
The sequencing rule, S1 (see Section 4), is the main rule used to construct a
modular correctness proof of a protocol that is a sequential composition of several
smaller subprotocols. It gives us a way of sequentially composing two roles P and P ′
when the logical formula guaranteed by the execution of P , i.e., the post-condition
of P , matches the pre-condition required in order to ensure that P ′ achieves some
property. In addition, just like in parallel composition, it is essential that the
composed protocols respect each other’s invariants. Our methodology for proving
properties of the sequential composition of two protocols involves the following steps.
(i) Prove separately the security properties of protocols Q1 and Q2.
Q1 Ψ1 and Q2 Ψ2
(ii) Identify the set of invariants used in the two proofs, Γ1 and Γ2. The formulas
included in these sets will typically be the formulas in the two proofs, which
were proved using the honesty rule. The proofs from the previous step can
be decomposed into two parts—the ﬁrst part proves the protocol invariants
using the honesty rule for the protocol, while the second proves the protocol
property using the invariants as hypotheses, but without using the honesty
rule. Formally,
Q1 Γ1,Γ1  Ψ1 and Q2 Γ2,Γ2  Ψ2
(iii) Weaken the hypotheses to Γ1 ∪ Γ2. The proof of the protocol properties is
clearly preserved under a larger set of assumptions.
Γ1 ∪ Γ2  Ψ1 and Γ1 ∪ Γ2  Ψ2
(iv) If the post-condition of the modal formula Ψ1 matches the pre-condition of Ψ
′
2,
then the two can be sequentially composed by applying the sequencing rule S1.
Here Ψ′2 is obtained from Ψ2 by a substitution of the free variables determined
by the sequential composition of the corresponding cords. This preserves the
formulas proved in the previous steps since those formulas are true under all
substitutions of the free variables. Assuming that Ψ1 and Ψ
′
2 are respectively
θ[P1]Xφ and φ[P2]Xψ, we have:
Γ1 ∪ Γ
′
2  θ[P1P2]Xψ
(v) Prove that the invariants used in proving the properties of the protocols, Γ1 ∪
Γ′2, hold for both the protocols. Since Q1 Γ1 was already proved in Step 1,
A. Datta et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 172 (2007) 311–358 337
in this step, it is suﬃcient to show that Q1 Γ
′
2 and similarly that Q2 Γ1.
By Lemma 6.6, we therefore have Q3 Γ1 ∪ Γ
′
2, where Q3 is their sequential
composition. From this and the formulas from steps 3 and 4, we can conclude
that the security properties of Q1 and Q2 are preserved under their sequential
composition and furthermore the following formula is provable.
Q3 θ[P1P2]Xψ
Lemma 6.6 If Q1 ψ and Q2 ψ, then Q3 ψ, where Q3 is a sequential composition
of Q1 and Q2, and the last step in the proof of ψ in both Q1 and Q2 uses the honesty
rule and no previous step uses the honesty rule.
Proof. Following the conclusion of the honesty rule, ψ must be of the form Honest(Xˆ)
⊃ φ for some formula φ. Suppose that the formula Honest(Xˆ) ⊃ φ can proved in
both Q1 and Q2 using the honesty rule. By the deﬁnition of the honesty rule, it
has to be that  Start(X) [ ]X φ and ∀ρ ∈ Q1 ∪ Q2.∀PBS(ρ).  φ [P ]X φ. Let Q
be a protocol obtained by the sequential composition of Q1 and Q2. Every basic
sequence P of a role in Q has to be a basic sequence of a role in Q1, or a basic
sequence of a role in Q2, or a concatenation of a basic sequence of a role in Q1 and
a basic sequence of a role in Q2. In the ﬁrst two cases,  φ [P ]X φ holds trivially,
in the third case  φ [P ]X φ follows by one application of the sequencing rule S1.
Therefore, by the application of the honesty rule, Q Honest(Xˆ) ⊃ φ. 
Theorem 6.7 If Q1 Γ1, Γ1  θ[P1]Xφ; Q2 Γ2, Γ2  φ[P2]Xψ; and Q1 Γ2,
Q2 Γ1, then Q3 θ[P1P2]Xψ, where Q3 is a sequential composition of Q1 and Q2.
In the proof technique just described, the invariants suﬃcient for the proofs are
independent of the order of the roles in the sequential composition. However, in
many situations the knowledge of the information ﬂow induced by the particular
ordering facilitates proofs in an intuitive and eﬀective way. SupposeQ is a sequential
composition of protocols Q1 and Q2, and r1; r2 is a role of Q where r1 and r2 are
roles of Q1 and Q2 respectively. In proving the invariance of a formula φ over the
protocol segment r2 we will use some history information from the prior execution
of r1. In the technical presentation below this history information appears as the
preconditions θri . The invariant induction is the usual induction for the honesty
rule strengthened by the preconditions. The precondition induction ensures that
the preconditions employed actually hold at the corresponding state of protocol
execution. This theorem builds on ideas developed in [38,68,67]to prove security
properties over the complex control ﬂow architectures of IEEE 802.11i and Kerberos
V5.
Theorem 6.8 If Q is a sequential composition of protocols Q1 and Q2 then we
can conclude Q Honest(Xˆ) ⊃ φ if the following conditions hold for all r1; r2 in Q,
where r1 ∈ Q1 and r2 ∈ Q2:
(i) (Invariant induction)
• ∀P ∈ BS(r1).  θr1 ∧ φ [P ]X φ and ∀P ∈ BS(r2).  θr2 ∧ φ [P ]X φ
(ii) (Precondition induction)
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•  Start(X)[ ]Xθr1 and  θr1 r1 θr2
• ∀P ∈ BS(r1).  θr1[P ]X θr1 and ∀P ∈ BS(r2).  θr2[P ]X θr2
With this background, the modiﬁed proof method can be divided into the fol-
lowing stages:
(i) Prove separately the security properties Ψ1 and Ψ2 assuming the set of invari-
ants Γ1 and Γ2 respectively. Formally,
Γ1  Ψ1 and Γ2  Ψ2
(ii) Weaken the hypotheses to Γ1 ∪ Γ2. The proof of the protocol properties is
clearly preserved under a larger set of assumptions.
Γ1 ∪ Γ2  Ψ1 and Γ1 ∪ Γ2  Ψ2
(iii) If the post-condition of the modal formula Ψ1 matches the pre-condition of Ψ
′
2,
then the two can be sequentially composed by applying the sequencing rule S1.
Here Ψ′2 is obtained from Ψ2 by a substitution of the free variables determined
by the sequential composition of the corresponding cords. This preserves the
formulas proved in the previous steps since those formulas are true under all
substitutions of the free variables. Assuming that Ψ1 and Ψ
′
2 are respectively
θ[P1]Xφ and φ[P2]Xψ, we have:
Γ1 ∪ Γ
′
2  θ[P1P2]Xψ
(iv) Prove that the invariants used in proving the properties of the protocols, Γ1∪Γ
′
2,
hold for Q using theorem 6.8. From this and step (iii), we can conclude:
Q θ[P1P2]Xψ
6.1 An Example of Protocol Composition
In this section we demonstrate the protocol composition methodology with an ex-
ample. First we show how the ISO-9798-3 key exchange protocol can be obtained
by composing an abstract signature-based challenge-response protocol and a simple
protocol based on Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange. Next we show how the authen-
tication properties and secrecy properties of the ISO-9798-3 protocol are proved
from properties of its parts. Extensions to the logic for handling Diﬃe-Hellman
primitives are presented in Appendix A.
6.1.1 ISO-9798-3 Protocol as a Sequential Composition
Figure 3 shows the ISO-9798-3 protocol in the informal arrows-and-messages no-
tation. The goal of the protocol is to obtain an authenticated shared secret be-
tween the two parties. Mutual authentication is provided using exactly the same
mechanism as in the CR protocol except two fresh Diﬃe-Hellman exponentials are
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A → B : ga
B → A : gb, SIGB{|g
b, ga, A|}
A → B : SIGA{|g
b, ga, B|}
Fig. 3. ISO-9798-3 protocol as arrows-and-messages
exchanged instead of nonces. Authenticated shared secret is obtained combining
the authentication property with the properties of the Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange
primitive.
The CR0 protocol can be thought of as an abstraction of the CR protocol
described in Section 2 and analyzed in Section 5. While the CR protocol generates
new nonces in each role, the roles of the CR0 protocol obtains terms m and n via
the input interface and use them in place of nonces. Intuition here is that the
authentication property of the CR protocol only depends on the fact that m and n
are fresh in the sense that no other threads may use them until they are send by
the originating threads, while the exact structure of terms m and n is irrelevant.
Roles of the CR0 protocol are given below:
InitCR0 ≡ (Yˆ ,m)[
send Xˆ, Yˆ ,m;
receive Yˆ , Xˆ, y, s;
verify s, (y,m, Xˆ), Yˆ ;
r := sign (y,m, Yˆ ), Xˆ ;
send Xˆ, Yˆ , r;
]X()
RespCR0 ≡ (n)[
receive Xˆ, Yˆ , x;
r := sign (n, x, Xˆ), Yˆ ;
send Yˆ , Xˆ, n, r;
receive Xˆ, Yˆ , t;
verify t, (n, x, Yˆ ), Xˆ ;
]Y ()
The DH0 protocol involves generating a fresh random number and computing
its Diﬃe-Hellman exponential. It is therefore the initial part of the standard Diﬃe-
Hellman key exchange protocol. It can be represented by a single role that computes
the new exponent and outputs the corresponding nonce via the output interface.
InitDH0 ≡ RespDH0 ≡ [new x; gx := expg x]X(gx)
The ISO-9798-3 protocol is a sequential composition of these two protocols. The
cords of ISO-9798-3 are obtained by sequential composition of the cord of DH0 with
the two cords of CR0. When sequentially composing cords, we substitute the output
parameters of the ﬁrst cord for the input parameters of the second and α-rename
bound variables to avoid variable capture. The roles of the ISO-9798-3 protocol
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are therefore:
InitISO≡ (Yˆ ,m)[
new x;
gx := expg x;
send Xˆ, Yˆ , gx;
receive Yˆ , Xˆ, y, s;
verify s, (y, gx, Xˆ), Yˆ ;
r := sign (y, gx, Yˆ ), Xˆ ;
send Xˆ, Yˆ , r;
]X()
RespISO ≡ (n)[
new y;
gy := expg y;
receive Xˆ, Yˆ , x;
r := sign (gy, x, Xˆ), Yˆ ;
send Yˆ , Xˆ, gy, r;
receive Xˆ, Yˆ , t;
verify t, (gy, x, Yˆ ), Xˆ ;
]Y ()
6.1.2 Compositional Proof Sketch
As we just demonstrated, the ISO-9798-3 protocol can be constructed by a se-
quential composition of DH0 and CR0. Here, we describe the key secrecy property
of DH0 and the mutual authentication property of CR0. We then prove that the
ISO-9798-3 protocol can be used to establish an authenticated shared secret by
composing the correctness proofs of these two protocols. In doing so, we follow the
method for proving sequential composition results presented in the previous section.
Challenge Response Protocol, CR
A proof of the mutual authentication property guaranteed by executing the
CR0 protocol is essentially the same as the proof for the CR protocol presented in
Section 5. The diﬀerence is that we use preconditions instead of the explicit new
actions to deduce the freshness of m. The property proved for the CR0 protocol is:
Γ2  Fresh(X,m)[InitCR0 ]XHonest(Yˆ ) ∧ Yˆ = Xˆ ⊃ φauth
Here, φauth models the authentication property, while Γ2 contains an appropriate
modiﬁcation of the two invariants γ1 and γ2 used in the proof as described in
Section 5:
γ1≡ Send(Y, t) ∧ Contains(t, SIGYˆ {|y,m, Xˆ |}) ⊃
(Gen(Y,m) ∨
(Receive(Y, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m)) < Send(Y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |}))))
γ2≡ (Receive(Y, (Xˆ, Yˆ ,m)) ∧ Send(Y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIGYˆ {|y,m, Xˆ |}))) ⊃
FirstSend(Y, y, (Yˆ , Xˆ, y, SIG
Yˆ
{|y,m, Xˆ |}))
Base Diﬃe-Hellman Protocol, DH0
The property of the initiator role of the DH0 protocol is given by the formula
below. We use HasAlone as a shortcut expressing that a term is private to a thread,
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i.e. HasAlone(X, t) ≡ Has(X, t) ∧ (Has(Y, t) ⊃ X = Y .
Γ1  Start(X)[new x; gx := expg x]XHasAlone(X,x) ∧ Fresh(X, gx)
This formula follows easily from the axioms and rules of the logic. It states that
after carrying out the initiator role of DH0, X possesses a fresh Diﬃe-Hellman
exponential gx and is the only one who possesses the exponent x. This property
will be useful in proving the secrecy condition of the ISO-9798-3 protocol. The set
of invariants used in this proof, Γ1, is empty.
Composing the Protocols
We now prove the security properties of the ISO-9798-3 protocol by composing
the correctness proofs of DH0 and CR0. In doing so, we follow the methodology
for proving sequential composition results outlined in Section 6. Let us go back and
look at the form of the logical formulas characterizing the initiator roles of DH0
and CR0. We have:
Γ1  Start(X) [InitDH0 ]X Fresh(X, gx)
Γ2  Fresh(X,m) [InitCR0]X Honest(Yˆ ) ∧ Yˆ = Xˆ ⊃ φauth
At this point, Step 1 and Step 2 of the proof method are complete. For Step 3, we
note that since Γ1 is empty, Γ2 ∪ Γ1 is simply Γ2.
Γ2  Start(X) [InitDH0 ]X Fresh(X, gx)(25)
Γ2  Fresh(X,m) [InitCR0]X Honest(Yˆ ) ∧ Yˆ = Xˆ ⊃ φauth(26)
We are ready to move on to Step 4. We ﬁrst substitute the output parameters of the
initiator cord for DH0 for the input parameters of the initiator cord of CR0. This
involves substituting gx for m. We refer to the modiﬁed protocol as CR′0. Since the
validity of formulas is preserved under substitution, the following formula is valid.
Γ2[gx/m]  Fresh(X, gx)
[
InitCR′
0
]
X
Honest(Yˆ ) ∧ Yˆ = Xˆ ⊃ φauth[gx/m]
Note that the post-condition of 25 matches the pre-condition of 26. We can therefore
compose the two formulas by applying the sequencing rule S1. The resulting formula
is:
Γ2[gx/m]  Start(X)
[
InitDH0 ; InitCR′
0
]
X
Honest(Yˆ ) ∧ Yˆ = Xˆ ⊃ φauth[gx/m]
The result of composing the two roles is that the freshly generated Diﬃe-Hellman
exponential is substituted for the nonce in the challenge-response cord. The result-
ing role is precisely the initiator role of the ISO-9798-3 protocol. The formula above
states that the mutual authentication property of CR0 is guaranteed assuming that
the invariants in Γ2 are satisﬁed. Finally, we use theorem 6.8 with the following
preconditions to establish the invariants Γ2:
For γ1 :
θInitDH0 ≡ θRespDH0 ≡ θRespCR0 ≡ 
θInitCR0 ≡ Gen(X,m)
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For γ2 :
θInitDH0 ≡ θRespDH0 ≡ θInitCR0 ≡ 
θRespCR0 ≡ Fresh(Y, n)
Therefore, we conclude that the protocol ISO-9798-3 , a sequential composition
of DH0 and CR0 respects the invariants in Γ2. This completes the compositional
proof for the mutual authentication property.
QISO Start(X) [InitISO]X Honest(Yˆ ) ∧ Yˆ = Xˆ ⊃ φauth[gx/m]
The other main step involves proving that the secrecy property of DH0 is pre-
served under sequential composition with CR0, since CR
′
0 does not reveal the Diﬃe-
Hellman exponents. The following two formulas are easily provable.
 Start(X) [InitDH0 ]X HasAlone(X,x)
HasAlone(X,x)
[
InitCR′
0
]
X
HasAlone(X,x)
Therefore, by applying the sequencing rule S1 again, we have the secrecy condition
for the ISO-9798-3 protocol:
 Start(X)
[
InitDH0; InitCR′
0
]
X
HasAlone(X,x)
Since the set of invariants is empty, Step 2, Step 3 and Step 5 follow trivially. The
rest of the proof uses properties of the Diﬃe-Hellman method of secret computation
to prove the following logical formula:
QISO Start(X)
[
InitDH0 ; InitCR′0
]
X
Honest(Yˆ ) ⊃(27)
∃Y, y. (Has(X, gxy) ∧ (Has(Z, gxy) ⊃ (Z = X ∨ Z = Y )))
Intuitively, the property proved is that if Yˆ is honest, then Xˆ and Yˆ are the
only people who know the Diﬃe-Hellman secret gxy. In other words, the ISO-9798-3
protocol can be used to compute an authenticated shared secret.
7 Other Results
In this section, we summarize other results associated with PCL and point the
interested reader to the relevant articles for further details.
7.1 PCL Proof Methods
In [22], we extend PCL with higher-order features (function variables) and present
an abstraction-reﬁnement proof method for reasoning about security protocols. The
main idea is to view changes in a protocol as a combination of ﬁnding a meaningful
“protocol template” that contains function variables in messages, and producing the
reﬁned protocol as an instance of the template. Using higher-order protocol logic,
we can develop a single proof for all instances of a template. A template can also be
instantiated to another template, or a single protocol may be an instance of more
than one template, allowing separate protocol properties to be proved modularly.
To give a simple example, suppose we have a protocol containing messages that use
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symmetric encryption, and suppose that some useful property of this protocol is
preserved if we replace symmetric encryption by use of a keyed hash. We can capture
the relationship between these two protocols by writing an “abstract” protocol
template with function variables in the positions occupied by either encryption or
keyed hash. Then the two protocols of interest become instances of the template. In
addition, a similar relationship often works out for protocol proofs. If we start with
a proof of some property of the protocol that contains symmetric encryption, some
branches of the proof tree will establish properties of symmetric encryption that
are used in the proof. If we replace symmetric encryption by a function variable,
then the protocol proof can be used to produce a proof about the protocol template
containing function variables. This is accomplished by replacing each branch that
proves a property of symmetric encryption by a corresponding hypothesis about
the function variable. Once we have a proof for the protocol template obtained
by abstracting away the speciﬁc uses of symmetric encryption, we can consider
replacing the function variable with keyed hash. If keyed hash has the properties of
symmetric encryption that were used in the initial proof, we can use proofs of these
properties of keyed hash in place of the assumptions about the function variable.
Thus an abstraction step and an instantiation step bring us both from a protocol
with symmetric encryption to a protocol with keyed hash, and from a proof of the
initial protocol to a proof of the ﬁnal one. The role of the protocol template in
this process is to provide a uniﬁed proof that leads from shared properties of two
primitives (symmetric encryption or keyed hash) to a protocol property that holds
with either primitive.
While the current paper focuses on authentication proofs, we have also devel-
oped a proof method for establishing secrecy properties [68]. Our general approach
involves showing that every protocol agent that receives data protected by one of
a chosen set of encryption keys only sends sensitive data out under encryption by
another key in the set. This reduces a potentially complicated proof about arbitrary
runs involving arbitrarily many agents and a malicious attacker to a case-by-case
analysis of how each protocol step might save and send data. We formalize this form
of inductive reasoning about secrecy in a set of new axioms and inference rules that
are added to PCL and prove soundness of the system over a conventional symbolic
protocol execution model. The extended logic may be used to prove authentication
or secrecy, independently and in situations where one property may depend upon
the other. Among other challenges, the inductive secrecy rule presented here is
carefully designed to be sound for reasoning about arbitrarily many simultaneous
protocols sessions, and powerful enough to prove meaningful properties about com-
plex protocols used in practice. While the reasoning principles are similar to the
“rank function method” [71] and work using the strand space execution model [74],
our main technical contribution is a set of mechanizable formal rules that codify
the non-formal mathematical arguments in these earlier papers. Another point of
technical diﬀerence is that we carry out our induction only over the steps of the
protocol without requiring any explicit reasoning over possible actions of a malicious
attacker.
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7.2 PCL Applications
PCL has been used to analyze a number of industrial security protocols includ-
ing the IEEE 802.11i wireless LAN security standard [38] (of which SSL/TLS is
a component), Kerberos V5 [68], and the IETF GDOI standard for secure group
communication [56].
The IEEE 802.11i standard allows a network access point to mutually authen-
ticate itself with user devices before providing connectivity. The protocol consists
of several parts, including an 802.1X authentication phase using TLS over EAP, a
4-Way Handshake to establish a fresh session key, and an optional Group Key Hand-
shake for group communications. Motivated by previous vulnerabilities in related
wireless protocols and evolution in 802.11i to provide better security, we carry out a
formal proof of correctness using PCL. Our proof consists of separate proofs of spe-
ciﬁc security properties for 802.11i components - the TLS authentication phase, the
4-Way Handshake protocol and the Group Key Handshake protocol. Using a new
form of PCL composition principle, formulated as staged composition in this paper,
we combine the component proofs to show that any staged use of the protocol com-
ponents achieves the stated security goals. It follows that the components compose
securely for a range of failure recovery control ﬂows, including the improvements
proposed in [37]. The general result also proves security for other conﬁgurations
presented in the 802.11i Standards document, including the use of a Pre-Shared
Key (PSK) or cached Pair-wise Master Key (PMK). In addition to devising a new
composition principle for PCL, we also extend the logic to handle local memory
associated with reusing generated nonces. The memory feature is needed to prove
correctness of an unusual feature of the improved 4-Way Handshake protocol [37]
that involves reusing a nonce to avoid a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Further-
more, the formal proof for the TLS protocol has independent interest since TLS is
widely used independent of 802.11i (e.g. [75]).
Kerberos [43] is widely used for authenticated client-server interaction in local
area networks. The basic protocol has three sections, each involving an exchange
between the client and a diﬀerent service. In recent work [68], we develop a formal
proof that is modular, with the proof for each section assuming a precondition and
establishing a postcondition that implies the precondition of the following section.
One advantage of this modular structure is illustrated by our proof for the PKINIT
[18] version that uses public-key infrastructure instead of shared secret keys in the
initial steps. Since only the ﬁrst section of PKINIT is diﬀerent, the proofs for the
second and third sections of the protocol remain unchanged. While lengthy machine-
checked proofs of Kerberos were previously given [7], and non-formal mathematical
proofs have been developed for other abstractions of Kerberos [15], this is the ﬁrst
concise formal logic proof of secrecy and authentication for Kerberos and PKINIT.
7.3 Computational PCL
While the work described so far is in the symbolic model of protocol execution and
attack (also called the “Dolev-Yao” model), we have also developed Computational
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PCL—a logic which is sound wrt the complexity-theoretic model of modern cryp-
tography [25,26,67]. Computational PCL inherits its syntax and reasoning methods
from PCL. However, the semantics of the logic is deﬁned wrt to a probabilistic
polynomial time model of protocol execution and attack.
Our central organizing idea (cf. [25]) is to interpret formulas as operators on
probability distributions on traces. Informally, representing a probability distribu-
tion by a set of equi-probable traces (each tagged by the random sequence used to
produce it), the meaning of a formula φ on a set T of traces is the subset T ′ ⊆ T in
which φ holds. This interpretation yields a probability: the probability that φ holds
is the ratio |T ′|/|T |. Conjunction and disjunction are simply intersection and union.
There are several possible interpretations for implication, and it is not clear at this
point which will prove most fruitful in the long run. Currently, we interpret φ⇒ ψ
as the union of ¬φ and the composition of ψ with φ; the latter uses the conditional
probability of ψ given φ. This interpretation supports a soundness proof for a siz-
able fragment of the protocol logic, and resembles the probabilistic interpretation
of implication in [62]. Since the logic does not mention probability explicitly, we
consider a formula “true” if it holds with asymptotically overwhelming probability.
In subsequent work, we formulate a speciﬁcation of secure key exchange that
is closed under general composition with steps that use the key and use the logic
to establish security properties of the ISO-9798-3 protocol [26]. We also develop a
proof method for establishing computational secrecy properties and apply it to the
Kerberos V5 protocol [67].
8 Related Work
A variety of methods and tools have been developed for analyzing the security guar-
antees provided by network protocols. The main lines of work include specialized
logics [13,73,32], process calculi [2,1,44,65] and tools [53,72], as well as theorem-
proving [64,63] and model-checking methods [45,59,66,70,10,3] using general pur-
pose tools. (The cited papers are representative but not exhaustive; see [55] for a
more comprehensive survey.)
There are several points of diﬀerence among these approaches. While most
model-checking tools can only analyze a ﬁnite number of concurrent sessions of a
protocol, some of the logics, process calculi, and theorem-proving techniques yield
protocol security proofs without bounding the number of sessions. With the excep-
tion of the BAN family of logics [13], most approaches involve explicit reasoning
about possible attacker actions. Finally, while security properties are interpreted
over individual traces in the majority of these methods, in the process calculi-based
techniques, security is deﬁned by an equivalence relation between a real protocol
and an ideal protocol, which is secure by construction. Inspite of these diﬀerences,
all of these approaches use the same symbolic model of protocol execution and
attack. This model seems to have developed from positions taken by Needham-
Schroeder [61], Dolev-Yao [28], and much subsequent work by others.
PCL shares several features with BAN [13], a specialized protocol logic. It is
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designed to be a logic for authentication, with relevant secrecy concepts. Both logics
annotate programs with assertions and use formulas for concepts like “freshness”,
“sees”, “said”, and “shared secret”. Furthermore, neither logic requires explicit
reasoning about the actions of an attacker.
On the other hand, PCL diﬀers from BAN on some aspects since it addresses
known problems with BAN. BAN had an abstraction step in going from the pro-
gram for the protocol to its representation as a logical formula. PCL avoids the
abstraction phase since formulas contain the program for the protocol. PCL uses a
dynamic logic set-up: after a sequence of actions is executed, some property holds in
the resulting state. It is formulated using standard logical concepts: predicate logic
and modal operators, with more or less standard semantics for many predicates
and modalities. Temporal operators can be used to refer speciﬁcally to actions that
have happened and the order in which they occurred. Formulas are interpreted over
traces and the proof system is sound with respect to the standard symbolic model
of protocol execution and attack. On the other hand, BAN was initially presented
without semantics. Although subsequently, model-theoretic semantics was deﬁned,
the interpretation and use of concepts like “believes” and “jurisdiction” remained
unclear. Finally, PCL formulas refer to speciﬁc states in protocol. For example, x
may be fresh at one step, then no longer fresh. In contrast, BAN statements are
persistent making it less expressive.
PCL also shares several common points with the Inductive Method [64]. Both
methods use the same trace-based model of protocol execution and attack; proofs
use induction and provable protocol properties hold for an unbounded number of
sessions. One diﬀerence is the level of abstraction. Paulson reasons explicitly about
traces including possible intruder actions whereas basic reasoning principles are
codiﬁed in PCL as axioms and proof rules. Proofs in PCL are signiﬁcantly shorter
and do not require any explicit reasoning about an intruder. Finally, while Paulson’s
proofs are mechanized using Isabelle, most proofs in PCL are hand-proofs. However,
PCL is amenable to automation and a tool implementation eﬀort is underway. An
interesting recent eﬀort that is similar to PCL, and the use of templates for abstract
protocols mentioned in Section 7.1, is reported in [4].
Early work on the protocol composition problem concentrated on designing pro-
tocols that would be guaranteed to compose with any other protocol. This led to
rather stringent constraints on protocols: in essence, they required the fail-stop
property [33] or something very similar to it [39]. Since real-world protocols are not
designed in this manner, these approaches did not have much practical application.
More recent work has therefore focussed on reducing the amount of work that is
required to show that protocols are composable. Meadows, in her analysis of the
IKE protocol suite using the NRL Protocol Analyzer [54], proved that the diﬀerent
sub-protocols did not interact insecurely with each other by restricting attention to
only those parts of the sub-protocols, which had a chance of subverting each other’s
security goals. Independently, Thayer, Herzog and Guttman used a similar insight
to develop a technique for proving composition results using their strand space
model [74]. Their technique consisted in showing that a set of terms generated by
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one protocol can never be accepted by principals executing the other protocol. The
techniques used for choosing the set of terms, however, is speciﬁc to the protocols
in [31]. A somewhat diﬀerent approach is used by Lynch [46] to prove that the
composition of a simple shared key communication protocol and the Diﬃe-Hellman
key distribution protocol is secure. Her model uses I/O automata and the protocols
are shown to compose if adversaries are only passive eavesdroppers.
In a recent paper [17], Canetti, Meadows and Syverson, revisit the protocol
composition problem. They show how the interaction between a protocol and its
environment can have a major eﬀect on the security properties of the protocol. In
particular, they demonstrate a number of attacks on published and widely used
protocols that are not feasible against the protocol running in isolation but become
feasible when they are run in parallel with certain other protocols. This study
further reinforces the importance of methods for reasoning about the composability
of protocols. We believe that the results presented in this dissertation represent
signiﬁcant progress in this direction. The methods presented in Section 6 provide
a way to implicitly characterize, using invariants, a class of protocols with which a
speciﬁc protocol can be safely composed. In particular, our formalism justiﬁes some
of the design principles discussed by the authors. One recommendation is that the
environment should not use keys or other secrets in unaltered form. Speciﬁcally,
the protocol under consideration should not encrypt messages with a key used to
encrypt messages by any protocol in its environment. The reason this makes sense
is that if two protocols use a particular form of encrypted message as a test to
authenticate a peer, then the attacker might be able to make a principal running
the ﬁrst protocol accept a message which actually originated in a run of the second
protocol. If this is indeed the case, then in our formalism, the invariant for the
protocol under consideration would fail to hold in such an environment, and the
composition proof would therefore not go through. However, this seems like an
overly conservative design approach since not every two protocols which use the
same encryption keys interfere with each other’s security. The invariant-preservation
method can help identify protocols which can run safely in parallel even if they share
keys. We note that the above principle has been followed in the design of real-world
protocols like IKE [36]. Also, Guttman and Fa´brega have proved a theoretical result
to the same eﬀect in their strand space model [34]. Another rule of thumb (also
recommended by Kelsey, Schneier and Wagner in [42]), is the use of unique protocol
identiﬁers to prevent a message intended for use in one protocol to be mistaken for
use in another protocol. This idea is also founded on similar intuition. To give
an example, in our logic, an invariant in proving an authentication property could
be: “if Bob generated a signature of a particular form, he sent it in response to a
particular message of a protocol”; adding the unique protocol identiﬁer inside the
signature will ensure that this invariant is trivially satisﬁed for all other protocols,
thereby allowing composability. However, many existing protocols do not follow
this principle.
It is well known that many natural security properties (e.g., noninterference)
are not preserved either under composition or under reﬁnement. This has been
A. Datta et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 172 (2007) 311–358348
extensively explored using trace-based modelling techniques [48,49,50,51,52], using
properties that are not ﬁrst-order predicates over traces, but second-order pred-
icates over sets of traces that may not have closure properties corresponding to
composition and reﬁnement. In contrast, our security properties are safety proper-
ties over sets of traces that satisfy safety invariants, thus avoiding these negative
results about composability.
There are some important diﬀerences between the way that we reason about
incremental protocol construction and alternative approaches such as “universal
composability” [16]. In universal composability, properties of a protocol are stated
in a strong form so that the property will be preserved under a wide class of composi-
tion operations. In contrast, our protocol proofs proceed from various assumptions,
including invariants that are assumed to hold in any environment in which the
protocol operates. The ability to reason about protocol parts under assumptions
about the way they will be used oﬀers greater ﬂexibility and appears essential for
developing modular proofs about certain classes of protocols.
Finally, we note that although there are some similarities between the composi-
tion paradigm of PCL and the assume-guarantee paradigm in distributed comput-
ing [58], there is also one important diﬀerence. In PCL, while composing protocols,
we check that each protocol respects the invariants of the other. This step involves
an induction argument over the steps of the two protocols. There is no reasoning
about attacker actions. One way to see the similarity with assume-guarantee is that
each protocol is proved secure assuming some property of the other protocol and
then discharging this assumption. The diﬀerence lies in the fact that the assumption
made does not depend on the attacker although the environment for each protocol
includes the attacker in addition to the other protocol.
9 Conclusions
Proving security properties of network protocols is a hard problem. One source
of diﬃculty is concurrency—security properties have to be guaranteed in an envi-
ronment where many sessions of multiple protocols simultaneously execute and the
attacker can use information acquired from one session to defeat the security goals
of another. Existing methods based on model-checking are useful for ﬁnding bugs,
but do not guarantee protocol security for an unbounded number of sessions. On
the other hand, explicit reasoning about traces containing honest principals’ and
attacker’s actions using theorem-proving approaches require considerable eﬀort and
expertise. We have therefore developed PCL—a logic for proving security proper-
ties of protocols. The proof system for PCL codiﬁes high-level reasoning principles
for security protocols and thereby allows succinct proofs of practical protocols (2–3
pages). PCL supports compositional reasoning about security protocols and has
been applied to a number of industry standards including SSL/TLS, IEEE 802.11i,
Kerberos V5, and GDOI, in several cases identifying serious security vulnerabili-
ties. While the logic was originally developed for the symbolic “Dolev-Yao” model
of protocol execution and attack, a variant of the logic with similar reasoning prin-
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ciples has also been developed for the computational model used by cryptographers.
We believe that this logic will prove useful in analyzing other protocols of practical
import as well as in the education of students on topics related to security protocols
and their design and analysis. One signiﬁcant direction for future work is to develop
useful tool support for the logic.
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A Extending the Logic with Diﬃe-Hellman Primitive
In order to keep the description of the core PCL simple, we introduce Diﬃe-Hellman
primitive as well as the associated proof rules and axioms as extension to the logic.
Our treatment of Diﬃe-Hellman primitive in this symbolic model is straight forward.
Exponentials such as ga mod p and shared secret gab mod p will be represented by
special terms g(a) and h(a, b) respectively. Similarly to the black-box model of
encryption and signature, we will assume that the only way to compute these terms
is via speciﬁed symbolic actions. Therefore, abstract away the number-theoretic
properties of Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange scheme.
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DH1 Computes(X, gab) ⊃ Has(X, gab)
DH2 Has(X, gab) ⊃
(Computes(X, gab) ∨ ∃m.(Receive(X,m) ∧ Contains(m, gab)))
DH3 (Receive(X,m) ∧ Contains(m, gab)) ⊃
∃Y,m′.(Computes(Y, gab) ∧ Send(Y,m′) ∧ Contains(m′, gab))
DH4 Fresh(X,a) ⊃ Fresh(X, ga)
Computes(X, gab) ≡ ( (Has(X,a) ∧ Has(X, gb)) ∨ (Has(X, b) ∧ Has(X, ga)) )
Table A.1
Diﬃe-Hellman Axioms
Programming Language and the Execution Model
Set of terms of PCL (see Table 1 in Section 2) is extended with constructs g(n)
and h(n, n), where n is a nonce. Informally, g(a) and h(a, b) will stand for ga mod p
and gab mod p respectively. To improve readability will often use ga and gab instead
of g(a) and h(a, b).
Set of actions of PCL (see Table 1 in Section 2) is extended with constructs
x := expg n and x := dhkeyken t, n modelling creation of the exponential ga given
a nonce a and the creation of the shared secret gab given an exponential gb and a
nonce a. Operational semantics of these two actions is deﬁned in a straight forward
manner, terms g(n) and h(a, b) respectively are substituted for the variable x.
Protocol Logic
We do not introduce additional formulas to the logic, we do need, however to
redeﬁne semantics of a few predicates. Semantics of predicate Fresh is extended so
that Fresh(X, gx) is true if and only if Fresh(X,x) is true. Semantics of predicate Gen
is redeﬁned in a similar fashion. Semantics of predicate Has is redeﬁned to model
the Diﬃe-Hellman property (ga)b = (gb)a, formally if Has(X,a) and Has(X, gb) are
true then Has(gab) and Has(X, gba are both true.
Proof System
Table A.1 presents the rules speciﬁc to the way that Diﬃe-Hellman secrets are
computed. The predicate Computes() is used as a shorthand to denote the fact that
the only way to compute a Diﬃe-Hellman secret is to possess one exponent and the
other exponential. Axiom DH1 states that if X can compute the Diﬃe-Hellman
secret, then she also possesses it. Axiom DH2 captures the intuition that the only
way to possess a Diﬃe-Hellman secret is to either compute it directly or obtain
it from a received message containing it. Axiom DH3 states that if a principal
receives a message containing a Diﬃe-Hellman secret, someone who has computed
the secret must have previously sent a (possibly diﬀerent) message containing it.
Axiom DH4 captures the intuition that if a is fresh at some point of a run, then
ga is also fresh at that point.
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B Soundness of Axioms and Proof Rules
In this section we prove the soundness of the axioms and proof rules used in the
proof system, hence proving Theorem 4.1. We omit proofs for standard axioms and
rules of temporal logic.
B.1 Axioms for protocol actions
AA1 [a]X a
Informally, this axiom says that if a is an action, and a the corresponding action
predicate, when thread X executes a, in the resulting state a holds. Let Q be a
protocol, and let R = R0R1R2 be a run such that R1|X matches a under substitution
σ and Q, R0 |= σφ, we need to prove that Q, R0R1 |= σa. Since R1|X matches a
under substitution σ, R1 has to contain action σa, and therefore, by the semantics
of the action predicates it has to be that Q, R0R1 |= a. Now, by the deﬁnition of
modal formulas we have Q |= [a]Xa.
AA2 Start(X)[ ]X ¬a(X)
AA3 ¬Send(X, t)[b]X¬Send(X, t) if σSend(X, t) = σb for all substitutions σ
AA4 [a; · · · ; b]Xa < b
Axiom AA2 simply says that no action predicate can hold if thread X executed no
actions. Axiom AA3 says that ¬Send(X, t) is preserved as long as no send actions
is performed that uniﬁes with the term t. Soundness of these two axioms trivially
follows from the semantics of action predicates and predicate Start. Soundness of
axiom AA4 directly follows from the semantics of modal formula and the temporal
ordering operator.
AN1 New(X,x) ∧ New(Y, x) ⊃ X = Y
AN2 φ[(νn)]X Has(Y, n) ⊃ (Y = X)
AN3 φ[(νn)]X Fresh(X,n)
AN4 Fresh(X,x) ⊃ Gen(X,x)
Informally, axioms AN1 and AN2 say that fresh nonces are unique and initially
secret to the originating thread. If a process X generates a new value m and takes
no further actions, then X is the only thread who knows m. The soundness of this
axiom follows from the deﬁnition of the execution model and the semantics of the
predicate “Has”. For a detailed proof see [30]. Axiom AN3 states that the newly
created value is fresh exactly after creation. The soundness of this axiom follows
directly from the semantics of the predicate Fresh. Axiom AN4 is trivially sound
by the semantics of predicate Gen.
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B.2 Possession axioms
PROJ Has(X, (x, y)) ⊃ Has(X,x) ∧ Has(X, y)
TUP Has(X,x) ∧ Has(X, y) ⊃ Has(X, (x, y))
ENC Has(X,x) ∧ Has(X,K) ⊃ Has(X,ENCK{|x|})
DEC Has(X,ENCK{|x|}) ∧ Has(X,K) ⊃ Has(X,x)
This set of axioms describes ways in which a thread can accumulate knowledge.
Informally, these axioms say that if a thread has all the necessary parts to build
some term then he has the term itself. Also, a thread can decompose tuples and
decrypt messages encrypted with a known key. Soundness of these axioms follows
directly from the semantics of the predicate “Has”. Here, we prove the soundness
of axiom ENC, proofs for other axioms are similar.
When Q,R |= Has(X,x) ∧Has(X,K) then Q,R |= ENC holds trivially. Other-
wise, by the semantics of “∧”, Q,R |= Has(X,x) and Q,R |= Has(X,K) both hold.
That means, that Hasi(X,x) and Hasj(X,K) for some i and j. Assuming i ≥ j, we
have Hasi(X,K) and therefore Hasi+1(X,ENCK{|x|}).
ORIG New(X,n) ⊃ Has(X,n)
REC Receive(X,x) ⊃ Has(X,x)
Informally, these axioms make connection between knowledge of a thread and the
actions executed by that thread in the past. A thread has all terms it creates
or receives. Soundness of these axioms follows directly from the semantics of the
predicate “Has”.
AR1 a(x)[match q(x)/q(t)]X a(t)
AR2 a(x)[verify x, t,K]X a(SIGK{|t|})
AR3 a(x)[y := dec x,K]X a(ENCK{|y|})
Axioms AR1, AR2 and AR2 are used to model obtaining information about
structure of terms as they are being parsed. We prove soundness of axiom AR1,
proofs for other two axioms are similar. LetQ be a protocol, and let R = R0R1R2 be
a run such that R1|X matches (q(x)/q(t)) under substitution σ and Q, R0 |= σa(x),
we need to prove that Q, R0R1 |= σ a(t). Since R1|X matches (q(x)/q(t)) under
substitution σ, and events of R1 only contain ground terms, it has to be that σx is
same as σt, and therefore Q, R0 |= a(t). Clearly, formulas of the form a(t) remain
valid as new actions are executed, hence Q, R0R1 |= σa(t).
B.3 Encryption and signature
SEC Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Decrypt(Y,ENCX{|n|}) ⊃ (Yˆ = Xˆ)
Informally, SEC says that if an agent Xˆ is honest, and some thread Y executed by
principal Yˆ has decrypted a message ENCX{|n|} (i.e. a message encrypted with Xˆ ’s
public key), then Yˆ must be Xˆ. In other words, if Xˆ is honest, then only threads
executed by Xˆ can decrypt messages encrypted Xˆ ’s private key. For a detailed
soundness proof of this axiom see [30].
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B.4 Preservation axioms
P1 Persist(X, t)[a]XPersist(X, t) where Persist ∈ {Has,FirstSend, a,Gen}
Informally this axiom says that the for some formulas stay valid when a thread
does additional actions. Since the semantics of the predicate “Has” is based on the
existence of a certain event in a run, adding additional events to the run cannot
make this predicates false. Also, action predicates, predicates FirstSend and Gen are
trivially preserved when additional actions are added to the run.
P2 Fresh(X, t)[a]XFresh(X, t) where t ⊆ a
Informally this axiom says that a nonce n remains fresh as long as it is not explicitly
used as a parameter in any action send out as a part of some message m. The
soundness of this axiom follows from the semantics of the predicate Fresh.
B.5 Temporal ordering of actions
FS1 Fresh(X, t)[send t′]XFirstSend(X, t, t
′) where t ⊆ t′
FS2 FirstSend(X, t, t′)∧a(Y, t′′) ⊃ Send(X, t′) < a(Y, t′′) where X = Y and t ⊆ t′′
Axiom FS1 says that the FirstSend(X, t, t’) predicate holds if a thread X sends
the term t′ containing t starting from a state where t is fresh. Soundness of this
axiom follows directly from the semantics of predicates Fresh and FirstSend. Axiom
FS2 says that the all actions a involving the term t which was fresh at some point,
must have happened after the ﬁrst time that t was send out. The soundness of this
axioms follows from the semantics of the predicate FirstSend, semantics of temporal
operator and Lemmas 2.1 and 2.3.
B.6 Axioms for Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange
Computes(X, gab) ≡ ((Has(X,a) ∧ Has(X, gb)) ∨ (Has(X, b) ∧ Has(X, ga)) )
DH1 Computes(X, gab) ⊃ Has(X, gab)
Informally, this axiom says that if some thread has all necessary information to
compute the Diﬃe-Hellman secret, then he also has the Diﬃe-Hellman secret itself.
The soundness of this axiom follows directly from the semantics of the predicate
“Has”.
DH2 Has(X, gab) ⊃ (Computes(X, gab) ∨ ∃m.( Receive(X,m) ∧ Contains(m, gab)))
Informally, this axiom says that the only way to have a Diﬃe-Hellman secret is to
compute it from one exponent and one exponential or receive it as a part of some
message. To prove the axiom we have to check all the cases in the semantics of the
predicate “Has”.
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DH3 ( Receive(X,m) ∧ Contains(m, gab)) ⊃
∃Y,m′.(Computes(Y, gab) ∧ Send(Y,m′) ∧ Contains(m′, gab))
Informally, this axiom says that if someone receives a Diﬃe-Hellman shared secret
then there must be some thread that send it and computed it himself. Let R be a
run in which X receives a message m containing gab at some point. By Lemma 2.3,
that means that in the run R there exists someone who send a message m containing
gab. Let R′ be a shortest preﬁx of R in which some agent Y sends some message m′
containing gab at some point. Since R′ is a shortest such preﬁx, that means that Y
could not receive a message m′′ containing gab. By axiom DH2 that means that Y
must have computed gab himself.
DH4 Fresh(X,a) ⊃ Fresh(X, ga)
Informally, this axiom states that a Diﬃe-Hellman exponential is fresh as long as the
exponent is fresh. The soundness of this axiom follows directly from the semantics
of the predicate “Fresh”.
B.7 Generic rules
G1 follows from the semantics of “∧” and “θ[P ]Xφ”. Let R = R0R1R2. If R1 does
not match P |X or Q,R0 |= θ then trivially Q,R |= θ[P ]Xφ∧ψ. Otherwise, it has to
be that Q,R0R1 |= φ and Q,R0R1 |= ψ, and Q,R |= θ[P ]Xφ ∧ ψ follows from the
semantics of “∧”. Validity of axioms G2 and G3 can be veriﬁed similarly. Axiom
G4 is trivially valid because if φ is true after any run, then φ is true after a speciﬁc
run that contains actions P .
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